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American courts are at times required to interpret the laws of authoritarian
countries. Though such cases are increasingly common, they remain—even today—a
poorly understood feature of modern adjudication. This Article seeks to fill that gap:
first by describing the scope and scale of American judicial engagement with
authoritarian legal systems, second by spelling out the interpretive challenges posed by
authoritarian laws, and third by building out a framework and vocabulary for
analyzing judicial responses to these challenges.
The laws of authoritarian countries raise novel questions of legal construction.
Such questions stem from a gap, mostly real but sometimes imagined, between our
own local assumptions about law and certain “nonconforming” features of
authoritarianism: sham laws, unwritten laws, party laws, politicized courts, and
bifurcated legal systems. Judicial responses to these challenges fall along a familiar
spectrum. Some methods have been more formalist, stressing strict correspondences.
Others have been more functionalist, embracing jurisprudential diﬀerence. The
optimal approach may be one in which judges tailor method to context, balancing an
open-minded pluralism against minimal but irreducible principles of legality.
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INTRODUCTION
American law has long deﬁned itself in relation to authoritarian law.1 It is
custom, almost ritual, for jurists to invoke such law as our opposite. The
Fourth Amendment is a “bulwark against police practices . . . in totalitarian
regimes.” 2 The writ of habeas corpus separates “our democracy” from
1
2

For a working deﬁnition of “authoritarianism,” see infra Section I.A.
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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“totalitarian governments.”3 The First Amendment must be read in light of
“how relentless authoritarian regimes are in their attempts to stiﬂe free
speech.”4 To invoke authoritarian legality is to remind us what we are not,
and in so doing, keep us moored to who we think we are.5
In a more mundane sense, however, the laws of authoritarian nations are
who we are—or at least, what we do. Modern doctrines of conﬂicts and
procedure place American judges into frequent contact with the laws of
authoritarian countries. Sometimes they must interpret such laws. 6 Other
times they must decide whether the foreign legal system is fair. 7 These
encounters bring authoritarian laws down to earth, where they are treated not
as rhetorical foil but, presumptively, as law, to be interpreted or assessed to
the best of a court’s ability.
For an unacquainted jurist, such laws can appear at once familiar but
strange, accessible yet elusive. Consider one example. Authoritarian legal
systems can contain documents that present as “laws” but are not practically
enforced. In such systems, there can exist other norms or prescripts that lack
the traditional hallmarks of legality but nonetheless bind with the force of law.
Where should judges locate law when the rules as written are not the norms
that bind? Do they observe formality and interpret a “law,” even a constitution,
that local courts would not dare apply? Or do they apply other prescripts, even
if they are unpublished, unwritten, or in other ways so un-law-like as to offend
basic legal sensibilities? Judges are not political scientists, or philosophers, or

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953).
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
5 Of course, the United States does not perfectly embody liberal democratic ideals; that has
not been true historically—slavery and restrictions on the franchise are but the starkest of many
examples—and it is not true today. Indeed, recent political events have led some scholars to assess
the susceptibility of American institutions to authoritarian backsliding. See generally CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, CAN IT HAPPEN HERE?: AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (2018); Aziz Huq & Tom
Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78 (2018); David Pozen & Josh
Chafetz, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1430 (2018).
6 See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir.
1998) (Russian Copyright Law); Forzley v. AVCO Corp. Elec. Div., 826 F.2d 974, 977 (11th Cir.
1987) (Saudi Labor Law); Villoldo v. Castro Ruz, 113 F. Supp. 3d 435, 439 (D. Mass. 2015) (Cuban
Law Nos. 567 and 568); Morris v. United States, No. 11-0926, 2014 WL 6982527, at *15 (M.D. Ala.
Dec. 9, 2014) (Vietnam’s Marriage and Family Law); United States v. Xu, No. 02-0674, 2008 WL
1315632, at *4-5 (D. Nev. Apr. 10, 2008) (Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China); Alosio v.
Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A., 426 F. Supp. 687, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Commercial Code of Iran);
In re Estate of Larkin, 416 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1966) (Soviet Civil Code).
7 See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that
Liberian “justices and judges . . . were subject to political and social inﬂuence”); Canadian Overseas
Ores, Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Paciﬁco S.A., 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(noting “serious questions about the independence of the Chilean judiciary vis a vis the military
junta currently in power”).
3
4
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comparativists. Nor should they be. But in such cases they must arrive at an
answer. How have they done so? And how ought they do so going forward?
This Article analyzes the interpretive problems posed by authoritarian
laws in American courts. Part I describes the state of authoritarian law
adjudication today and in the recent past, cataloging the relevant countries,
cases, and doctrines. Part II illustrates how, in theory and in practice,
autocratic legal systems can present interpretive challenges distinct from
those associated with foreign law generally. Part III identiﬁes two methods,
formalism and functionalism, that summarize common judicial approaches to
authoritarian law. These methodological choices implicate important
tradeoﬀs between accuracy and eﬃciency, comity and expressivity, requiring
judges to balance competing and at times irreconcilable duties inherent in the
judicial role. The Article closes with a few modest suggestions for how judges
can better manage such challenges.
*

*

*

The last scholar to address “illiberal” law adjudication did so more than a
quarter-century ago. 8 In proposing a “liberal internationalist model of
transnational legal relations,”9 Anne-Marie Slaughter discussed why American
courts might view the laws of illiberal states as “beyond law”: ideological
conflict, the “shadow” of military conflict, and “the difficulty of judicial
dialogue.”10 If liberal courts applied illiberal law as “law,” Slaughter feared, they
risked “validating it according to liberal principles.”11 Better, she concluded, to

8 The literature on foreign law adjudication is more voluminous. See generally, e.g., Gregory S.
Alexander, The Application and Avoidance of Foreign Law in the Law of Conflicts: Variations on a Theme of
Alexander Nekam, 70 NW. L. REV. 602 (1976); John R. Brown, 44.1 Ways to Prove Foreign Law, 9 MAR.
LAW. 179 (1984); Roger M. Michalski, Pleading and Proving Foreign Law in the Age of Plausibility Pleading,
59 BUFF. L. REV. 1207 (2011); Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to Determining
Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1967); Roger J. Miner, The
Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. Federal Courts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 581 (1995); Arthur Nussbaum, The
Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018 (1941); Milton Pollack, Proof of Foreign Law, 26 AM. J.
COMP. L. 470 (1978); Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31 (2011);
Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a
Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887 (2011). For a survey of foreign law
interpretation in twenty-nine countries, see generally YUKO NISHITANI, TREATMENT OF FOREIGN
LAW—DYNAMICS TOWARDS CONVERGENCE? (2017).
9 Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State
Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1909 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter
Slaughter]. Burley currently goes by the last name Slaughter.
10 Id. at 1920-22.
11 Id. at 1911.
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avoid applying illiberal laws in certain settings and thereby mark such laws as
outside a “zone of legitimate difference.”12
Slaughter’s work is best read in the context of its time. Three years earlier,
Francis Fukuyama had asserted that the world was converging towards “the end
of history . . . [,] the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final
form of human government.” 13 Writing in a similar tradition, Slaughter
envisaged a world in which dense legal linkages connected liberal nations with
one another, excluding illiberal nations until they too joined in the “emerging
political consensus on basic rights under law.”14 Treating illiberal law as lacking
legitimacy was, for Slaughter, a means to promote “progressive change.”15
The world has changed since the end of the Cold War, and not always in
ways liberal internationalists have predicted. While some countries have
liberalized, in other places authoritarianism has endured, even strengthened,16
and liberal democracy has begun to backslide.17 Democracy export, once a “key
12 Id. at 1919 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1913 (suggesting courts should
“reinterpret ‘deference’ to nonliberal sovereigns as the ostracism of an outlaw”).
13 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT’L INT., Summer 1989, at 3, 3.
14 Slaughter, supra note 9, at 1913, 1917-20.
15 Id. at 1987. Slaughter’s vision was “premised on the desirability of expanding the zone of
liberal states” to foster conditions for a Neo-Kantian peace. Id. Today, of course, it is not practical or
accurate (if it ever was), to divide the world into liberal countries within a “zone of law,” and illiberal
countries without. Harold Koh has argued that a state’s liberal identity is not “exogenously or
permanently given,” and that illiberal states quite plainly “do law” with one another, particularly in
international commercial law. Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2650 (1997); see also José Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal
Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 183, 192-210 (2001) (doubting liberal theory’s liberal/illiberal distinction).
16 See, e.g., Mathew Burrows, The Long View on Authoritarianism’s Second Wind, in IS
AUTHORITARIANISM STAGING A COMEBACK? 3, 4 (Mathew Burrows & Maria J. Stephan eds., 2015)
(describing a “wall of resistance” to democracy in China, Eurasia, and most of the Middle East);
Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner & Christopher Walker, Introduction to AUTHORITARIANISM GOES
GLOBAL: THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY 3, 4 (Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner & Christopher
Walker eds., 2016) (naming an “authoritarian surge” led by China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Venezuela as one of three notable trends following the Cold War).
17 Democratic expansion between the mid-1970s and early 1990s is often referred to as the “Third
Wave” of democratization. Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy’s Third Wave, J. DEMOCRACY, Spring
1991, at 12, 12. Since 1995, however, the progress of democratization “began to slow, and only modest
gains were achieved in the following decade.” Marc F. Plattner, Is Democracy in Decline?, J.
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2015, at 5, 7. Even more recent trend lines suggest that the “Third Wave” of
democracy has “peaked.” Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq, How We Lost Constitutional Democracy, in CAN IT
HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA 135, 141 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018). Political
scientists have debated the extent of democratic retreat or backsliding in recent years. See, e.g., LARRY
DIAMOND & MARC F. PLATTNER, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE? (2015); JOSHUA KURLANTZICK,
DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT: THE REVOLT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 8-9 (2013) (discussing how
democracy ratings for East European countries have fallen in recent years); Valeriya Mechkova, Anna
Lührmann & Staffan I. Lindberg, How Much Democratic Backsliding?, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 2017, at
162, 162-64 (“The average level of democracy in the world has slipped back to where it was before the
year 2000.”). Other scholars have expressed a similar “concern with the health of constitutional
democracies.” Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONAL
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organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy,”18 has largely fallen by the wayside.19
Meanwhile, the economic, political, and cultural linkages between liberal and
illiberal countries have only grown. American legal actors are now deeply
enmeshed in the structures, institutions, and laws of autocratic countries. 20
Authoritarianism has evolved too. In Russia it has become less ideological.21 In
China it has become in some ways more consultative. 22 We now speak of

DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 1, 2 (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018); see also
David S. Law, Alternatives to Liberal Constitutional Democracy, 77 MD. L. REV. 223, 224-25 (2017) (noting
that “[r]eflexive allegiance to constitutional democracy has not been the case in Latin America . . . and
it certainly cannot be assumed in Asia”). Still others have sought to explain liberalism’s declining appeal.
See, e.g., PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED 3-6 (2018).
18 THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 3 (1999).
19 “U.S. democracy high policy has reached its lowest ebb of at least the past forty years.”
Thomas Carothers & Frances Z. Brown, Can U.S. Democracy Policy Survive Trump?, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Oct. 1, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/01/canu.s.-democracy-policy-survive-trump-pub-77381 [https://perma.cc/L4LJ-5N75]; cf. William P.
Alford, Exporting “The Pursuit of Happiness,” 113 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1681 (2000) (reviewing
THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999)) (calling
for humility and introspection in approaching democracy export).
20 See, e.g., ARCH PUDDINGTON, BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: GOALS, STRATEGIES, AND
METHODS OF MODERN AUTHORITARIANS 2 (2017), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/June
2017_FH_Report_Breaking_Down_Democracy.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WP7-PYRY] (describing how
“autocracies” such as China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Ethiopia are increasingly
employing “political consultants and lobbyists from democratic countries to represent the[ir] interests”).
Outbound investment flows have brought companies in authoritarian countries into close contact with
American regulatory regimes. See generally JI LI, THE CLASH OF CAPITALISMS?: CHINESE
COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (2018). Relatedly, statutes like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
have enmeshed American laws and lawyers with institutions and practices in countries like Russia, China,
and Saudi Arabia. See generally, e.g., Matthew S. Erie, Anticorruption as Transnational Law: The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, PRC Law, and Party Rules in China, 67 AM. J. COMP. L. 233 (2019). Global
governance reforms have also required American lawyers to be more attentive to state-centered economic
structures found in places like China. See generally Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade
Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 261 (2016). Closer to home, many American universities have struggled
with issues arising from partnerships with institutions in authoritarian countries. See Martin S. Flaherty,
“But for Wuhan?”: Do Law Schools Operating in Authoritarian Regimes Have Human Rights Obligations?, 5
DREXEL L. REV. 297, 302-08 (2013).
21 See Sam G. McFarland, Vladimir S. Ageyev & Marina A. Abalakina-Paap, Authoritarianism
in the Former Soviet Union, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1004, 1008 (1992) (concluding that
“the rapid demise of communism has deprived Soviet authoritarianism of its ideology”). But recent
years have seen a rise in conservative nationalism in Russia.
22 See Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2003, at 6, 6; Rory Truex,
Consultative Authoritarianism and its Limits, 50 COMP. POL. STUD. 329, 330 (2017) (describing the
adoption of public opinion polling, participatory budgeting, and other “input institutions” in Chinese
governance); Steve Tsang, Consultative Leninism: China’s New Political Framework, 18 J. CONTEMP.
CHINA 865, 866 (2009) (describing Chinese governance as “a system that blends together the Leninist
instrument of control with innovations from other sources”). See generally MARTIN K. DIMITROV,
WHY COMMUNISM DID NOT COLLAPSE: UNDERSTANDING AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE IN
ASIA AND EUROPE (2013). In other areas, however, Chinese rule has become more centralized and
personalistic. See Susan L. Shirk, China in Xi’s “New Era”: The Return to Personalistic Rule, J.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2018, at 22, 23.
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intermediate regime types, with new labels such as “illiberal democracy” or
“competitive authoritarianism” conveying the many colors and hues of modern
illiberal governance.23
These changes introduce both new complexities and a renewed urgency to
the challenges posed by authoritarian laws in U.S. courts. Such cases have
become fixtures on the dockets of many district courts, especially in commercial
centers. In a recent Term, the Supreme Court grappled with how much
deference to accord an interpretation of Chinese law submitted by the Chinese
government.24 “Given the world’s many and diverse legal systems,” the Court
concluded, the appropriate level of deference ought to account for, among other
things, “the transparency of the foreign legal system.” 25 How should courts
regard legal sources from authoritarian nations? How should judges deal with
legal systems that appear “modern” in some sectors but “aberrational” in others?
Questions such as these remain either unaddressed or undertheorized since
Slaughter formulated a version of the problem decades earlier. This Article takes
up the inquiry anew, at a time in which the end of history is nowhere in sight.
I. JUDICIAL ENCOUNTERS WITH FOREIGN AUTHORITARIAN LAW
I begin with a thick account of authoritarian law adjudication, identifying
the relevant countries, courts, cases, sources, and doctrines. American judges,
I ﬁnd, have engaged more deeply with foreign illiberal law than many would
expect. While this may irk those hostile to foreign law in general, it comports
with what scholars of transnational litigation have suggested for some time:
globalization has created innumerable touch-points between disparate legal
orders, and despite a parochialism in American law,26 judicial encounters with
the laws of autocratic countries are increasingly unavoidable.

23 See, e.g., Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, J.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, 51, 52-54 (deﬁning “competitive authoritarianism” as a regime in which
elections serve as “the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority,” but in which
incumbents frequently hold on to power though the violation of democratic rules); Fareed Zakaria,
The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 22, 22 (coining the term “illiberal
democracy”). A parallel phenomenon has developed with respect to constitutionalism. See, e.g.,
Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 394 (2015) (developing
the concept of “authoritarian constitutionalism”); see also David S. Law & Mila Versteeg,
Constitutional Variation Among Strains of Authoritarianism, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES 165, 181-87 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 2014) (describing the use of “sham
constitutions” by diﬀerent types of authoritative regimes).
24 Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1873-74 (2018).
25 Id. at 1873.
26 See Pamela Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1081, 1088-1108 (2015)
(describing American courts’ “studied avoidance” of transnational litigation); Maggie Gardner,
Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941, 944 & n.1 (2017) (expressing concern that “the federal
courts’ procedural decisions are problematically biased in favor of U.S. parties and U.S. law”).
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A. Defining Authoritarian Law
Before turning to description, it may be helpful to specify what I mean
and do not mean by “authoritarian law.” To start, I do not mean laws that
are substantively authoritarian, e.g., those that repress civil and political
rights, though such laws are presumably more prevalent in authoritarian
countries. Rather, I am interested in all rules that purport to be laws in
authoritarian countries.27
What makes a country authoritarian? As I see it, authoritarianism refers
to (1) a distinct form of governance (2) deﬁned not merely by the absence of
free elections, (3) but by a set of aﬃrmative practices that maintain unfettered
rule through undermining institutions and processes that hold ultimate
decisionmakers accountable.
My first proposition—that authoritarianism is a distinct form of
governance—may seem obvious. It warrants discussion though because
authoritarianism has in other corners of the literature been regarded merely as
a residual category, encapsulating all that is not democracy. 28 This view is
sensible if one sees authoritarianism as an aberration, which may appeal to
scholars of democratic transition. 29 But for students of authoritarianism
specifically, the definition leaves something to be desired. For one, it treats
authoritarianism as a container concept that includes other regime types to
which “authoritarian” would be an ill-fitting label, such as the failed state.30 It
also ignores the ways in which authoritarianism is itself a distinct mode of
“organizing political life,” with consequences for a number of governance
outcomes, 31 including the nature of law and legal institutions.

27 Courts may refuse to apply foreign laws, including those that are substantively authoritarian,
if they contravene the public policy of the forum. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). The “public policy exception,” however, is not commonly
invoked. As Justice Cardozo explained, not “every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal
with it otherwise at home.” Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201-02 (N.Y. 1918). But see
EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 389 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2010).
28 See José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi & James Raymond Vreeland, Democracy and
Dictatorship Revisited, PUB. CHOICE, Apr. 2010, at 67, 83 (stating that autocracies have been treated
“as a residual category for much time—everything that democracy is not”).
29 The “umbrella” assumption of the transition paradigm is that “any country moving away
from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy.” Thomas
Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2002, at 5, 6. This assumption is
not only empirically false, see id., it is also conceptually misleading.
30 Failed states are states that have “lo[st] control over the means of violence,” unable to “create
peace or stability for their populations or control their territories.” Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed
States, or the State as Failure?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2005).
31 See Cheibub et al., supra note 28, at 83 (“[D]ictatorships increasingly are recognized as a
political regime encompassing diﬀerent ways of organizing political life that have consequences for
understanding policies, outcomes, and the stability of authoritarianism itself.”).
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For similar reasons, I reject a minimalist definition of authoritarianism as
any system that lacks free and competitive elections.32 A lack of genuine popular
contestation for political power is characteristic of all authoritarian regimes. But,
like authoritarianism-as-aberration, a negative Schumpeter-ian definition
obscures the affirmative practices that characterize authoritarian rule.33
Put simply, authoritarianism is best understood as a regime-level
commitment to a set of practices that help unfetter rule through undermining
institutions that hold ultimate decisionmakers accountable. Interfering with
elections, to the extent they even occur, is a key tactic within this broader arsenal
of practices, but it is just one practice. Also “authoritarian” are the restrictions
on expression, press freedom, governmental transparency, civil society, and
judicial independence that help dislodge the ultimate decisionmaker(s) from
institutionalized constraints.34
By deﬁning authoritarianism as a system-wide commitment to certain
aﬃrmative practices, one can more easily determine whether there is anything
distinctive about authoritarian law. Law, after all, is not just a tool of
governance; it can also be an institution of accountability. As explained
further below, the ways in which autocrats attempt to stiﬂe, manage, and
control this particular institution has signiﬁcant implications for the nature
of autocratic law. This deﬁnition also accords better with common usage.
When analysts speak of rising authoritarianism around the world, they do not
just mean that elections have become less fair. They speak too of assaults on
other accountability institutions that might otherwise constrain limitless rule,
including courts, civil society, and the media.35

32 One leading study, for instance, coded a regime as “autocratic” whenever the executive
attained power through “any means besides direct, reasonably fair, competitive elections.” Barbara
Geddes, Joseph Wright & Erica Frantz, Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data
Set, 12 PERSP. POL. 313, 317 (2014).
33 There are of course compelling methodological reasons for deﬁning authoritarianism more
thinly; dichotomous proxy-variable categorizations may be necessary in large-n studies, for example.
34 This conception of authoritarianism draws inspiration from Marlies Glasius’s definition of
“authoritarian practices” as “accountability sabotage.” See Marlies Glasius, What Authoritarian Is . . . and
Is Not: A Practice Perspective, 94 INT’L AFF. 515, 525-26 (2018). Glasius defines an “authoritarian practice”
as “a pattern of actions, embedded in an organized context, sabotaging accountability to people (‘the
forum’) over whom a political actor exerts control, or their representatives, by disabling their access to
information and/or disabling their voice.” Id. at 527. I do not follow her definition in full. I define
authoritarianism at the regime-level; I focus not just on practices that disable information or the voice of
the people, but also on other institutional checks on power, such as courts; and I stress the effectively
supralegal status of the ultimate decider(s).
35 See, e.g., Brian Klaas, Trump’s Authoritarian Backlash Has Already Begun, WASH. POST (Nov. 9,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/11/09/trumps-authoritarianbacklash-has-already-begun/?utm_term=.19a2905e80b2 [https://perma.cc/72X6-J2ST] (describing
President Donald Trump’s “attack on press freedom” as “dangerously authoritarian”). To be clear, an
increase in “authoritarian practices” in places like the United States has not rendered America an
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None of this is to say authoritarian countries reject accountability
institutions entirely. Large autocracies may rely on judges or journalists to
keep local oﬃcials in line. The deﬁning feature of authoritarianism, however,
is that the ultimate decider(s) are programmatically and successfully engaged
in undermining accountability processes. Authoritarianism, writes Mark
Tushnet, generally requires “a single decision maker . . . whose decisions are
both formally and practically unregulated by law.”36
A final note: I sometimes use the term “authoritarian” interchangeably with
“illiberal.” The two concepts are not coterminous. Liberalism refers to a
commitment to values associated with the Enlightenment: pluralism, tolerance,
and individual liberty, while authoritarianism is a mode of political organization.
But authoritarian governance is fundamentally illiberal in its ordering of the
state over the individual. It is that element of illiberalism that I emphasize.
B. Global Trends
1. Cross-Country Comparisons
To set the scene, I begin with some basic data points. How often do U.S.
courts engage with the laws of speciﬁc authoritarian countries? Have
encounter rates changed over time? Which courts encounter authoritarian
laws most often?
I answer these questions by comparing search statistics on Westlaw. For each
target country, I entered three distinct search strings into the main Westlaw
Edge case database (“All State & Federal”). In the case of Vietnam, for example,
I searched: (1) Vietnam!37 /8 law; (2) Vietnam! & 44.1; (3) Vietnam! /8 forum.
The first string generates all cases within the database in which the country term
appears within eight words of “law.” Through trial and error, I concluded that a
“/8” search tended to maximize relevant cases without yielding too many
irrelevant cases. 38 The second search string generates all cases in which the

“authoritarian state,” for attacks on accountability institutions have not resulted in the existence of an
effectively supralegal decisionmaker in American politics.
36 Tushnet, supra note 23, at 448 & n.296 (2015) (acknowledging that the single decisionmaker
could be a collective body).
37 The exclamation point generates searches for all instances in which the word “Vietnam” or
any word that begins with “Vietnam” (such as “Vietnamese”) appears. Where relevant, I used the
“!” key for every country on my list: e.g., “Afghan!”; “Angola!”; “Azerbaijan!” The main exception
was China, for which I instead used “China OR Chine!”. Had I instead used “Chin!,” I would have
generated too many nonresponsive results given how often “Chin” appears as a party surname.
38 The (admittedly crude) trial and error process proceeded as follows: I examined every case
in the database in which both “China OR Chine!” and “law” appeared. I then reviewed search results
for various searches: e.g., “China OR Chine!” /2 law”; “China OR Chine!” /3 law.” I found that
when the /? number fell below 8, the search string would miss cases involving extensive judicial
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country term and “44.1” both appear. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1
governs determinations of foreign law. Unlike the first string, which aims to
maximize relevant hits, this second string minimizes false positives. The third
string generates all cases in which the country term appears within eight words
of “forum.” This string targets cases involving forum non conveniens, an analysis
that often requires evaluation of an alternative forum’s legal system.
To determine which countries qualify as “authoritarian,” I consulted the
POLITY IV database. POLITY scores measure regime type by “coding the
authority characteristics of states.” 39 Individual coding scores are aggregated
into a Combined POLITY Score ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10
(strongly autocratic).40 Unlike other indices that primarily measure political and
civil rights,41 POLITY scores measure “authority” characteristics that somewhat
better approximate the definition of “authoritarianism” adopted in this Article.
One variable, for instance, looks to the degree of actual constraint on the powers
of the chief executive. 42 Another variable assesses whether “significant
oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling
party.”43 After making a few minor adjustments,44 I searched Westlaw for all
countries that had POLITY scores between 0 and -10 in 2016.
The approach is imperfect. Relying on a single year’s POLITY scores
does not account for variation over time. Chile may not have been on the 2016
autocracy list, but it certainly was under Pinochet.45 Conversely, Turkey had

engagement with Chinese law. When the /? number exceeded 8, the search generated many
irrelevant hits without appreciably increasing the number of relevant hits.
39 MONTY G. MARSHALL, TED ROBERT GURR & KEITH JAGGERS, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC
PEACE, POLITY IV PROJECT: POLITICAL REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSITIONS, 18002017, DATASET USERS’ MANUAL 1 (2018), http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GK7-LY92]. Coding variables for “autocracy” include: competitiveness of
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive,
regulation of participation, and competitiveness of participation. Id. at 16.
40 The calculation technically requires the calculation of two scores, an AUTOC and DEMOC
score. The Combined POLITY Score is computed by subtracting the former from the latter. Id. at 16.
41 The most prominent of these is the Freedom House score. For a discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of using Freedom House and POLITY scores as regime measures, see Cheibub
et al., supra note 28, at 74-79.
42 See Marshall et al., supra note 39, at 24.
43 Id. at 26.
44 The biggest adjustment was to include Russia, which the 2016 POLITY measures regard as a
weak democracy rather than an autocracy. See MONTY G. MARSHALL & GABRIELLE ELZINGAMARSHALL, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, GLOBAL REPORT 2017: CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE, AND
STATE FRAGILITY 47 (2017), http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/GlobalReport2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M6TQ-UFLQ]. I included the former Soviet Union as a separate entry. I also omitted a few
smaller autocracies—Chad, Jordan, Oman, and even Angola. Because these country share names with
individual persons, typically lawyers or parties, Westlaw searches were unhelpfully overinclusive.
45 See CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORT 2010: CHILE 1-2 (2011),
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Chile2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR5E-WJKP].
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a negative POLITY score in 2016,46 but as recently as 2010, it was rated a
fairly strong democracy. 47 In general, though, the major countries on this
list—indeed, the ones most likely to appear on U.S. dockets—have remained
stably autocratic through recent decades.
The results are presented in Table 1. Each country is ranked by its
composite score—the sum of the three individual search results minus any
overlapping cases. 48 Though the scores lack meaning by themselves, they
facilitate comparison between countries.
Table 1: Westlaw Search Hits by Country (July 23, 2019)

Country

Total Unique
Search Hits
China
3,960
Turkey
1,405
Russia
1,361
Cuba
1,182
Iran
933
Saudi Arabia
760
Venezuela
751
Singapore
578
Vietnam
503
Egypt
465
Thailand
410
Soviet Union
328
Kuwait
255
UAE
238
Libya
166
Sudan
157
Afghanistan
156
Congo
141

Search Hits
/8 law
3,544
1,281
1,218
1,046
708
590
573
456
456
358
375
286
206
208
122
100
137
81

Search Hits
& 44.1
318
108
153
147
126
42
122
88
38
65
28
52
44
33
40
54
28
33

Search Hits
/8 forum
310
104
138
39
188
149
177
159
31
99
27
6
34
30
14
13
7
29

See MARSHALL & ELZINGA-MARSHALL, supra note 44.
See CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORT 2010: TURKEY 1 (2011),
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Turkey2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HJ7-MEDR]. Turkey’s
2010 POLITY score was 7. Id.
48 The search string for the composite score for Vietnam would be (Vietnam! /8 law) OR
(Vietnam! & 44.1) OR (Vietnam! /8 forum).
46
47

2020]
Syria
Morocco
Laos
Ethiopia
Kazakhstan
Cambodia
Qatar
Yemen
Bahrain
Uganda
Cameroon
Rwanda
Belarus
North Korea
Turkmenistan
Togo
Eritrea
Azerbaijan
Uzbekistan
Equatorial
Guinea
Mauritania
Swaziland
Tajikistan
Burundi
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135
129
120
86
82
70
60
57
55
40
38
34
28
27
27
24
20
19
17
15

116
114
100
67
65
66
46
48
41
34
31
32
22
24
26
15
16
7
16
13

22
14
18
15
12
5
8
8
11
6
3
2
6
3
1
4
0
7
1
2

6
11
4
10
10
1
13
5
14
3
11
0
1
0
2
6
5
6
0
3

5
5
3
3

5
5
2
2

0
0
1
0

0
0
0
2

A few trends stand out. First, China tops the list in every category. That
is, regardless of search string, searches for China return the most cases. Other
countries with high case counts include Turkey, Russia, the Soviet Union,
Cuba, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Singapore, Egypt, and Vietnam.
For context, consider composite search results for nonauthoritarian
countries. A search of English or British law generates composite figures of over
10,000 hits. Composite searches for French law also yields over 10,000 hits, while
searches for Canadian and German law yield 8139 and 8395 hits respectively. In
contrast, China’s composite number is 3960. While substantially lower than the
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aforementioned countries, this figure nonetheless exceeds the composite figures
for Israel (2634), Italy (2243), Japan (2350), and Australia (1387).
Even if absolute search figures are higher in France and England, rates of
authoritarian law adjudication have grown significantly over time. Consider Table
2, which plots composite search hits over successive five-year periods since 1979
for three countries: China, Russia/Soviet Union (combined), and Saudi Arabia.
Table 2: Search Hits over Time – China, Russia/Soviet Union, and
Saudi Arabia (July 23, 2019)
1200
1000
800
600

China
Russia/USSR

400

Saudi Arabia

200

19
79
-8
3
19
84
-8
8
19
89
-9
3
19
94
-9
8
19
99
-0
20 3
04
-0
8
20
09
-13
20
14
-18

0

China, in particular, has had its case counts grow from less than 200 in the
ﬁve-year periods before the turn of the millennium to a high of over 1000 in
the ﬁve-year period beginning in 2009.
None of these results are surprising. The countries that top the lists—China,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—tend to be significant geopolitical and
economic players; they and their people have significant business relationships
with American and multinational entities; and their citizens frequently travel or
emigrate to the United States. These and other touchpoints set the stage for a
variety of disputes that demand judicial resolution.
Search statistics alone, however, tell us little of the nature of these
interactions: the laws that have been interpreted, the assessments judges have
made, and the role of other actors within the interpretive process. The
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following subsection provides a more granular account of judicial touch-points
with authoritarian law, focusing on the country that has led every table so far.
2. Judicial Encounters with Chinese Law
For most of American history, judges engaged only sporadically with
Chinese law. Such laws would arise on occasion in family or immigration
disputes, but without experts or special materials, judges resorted to general
principles of law instead. 49 So sparse was the availability of Chinese law
expertise that one judge in 1928 considered U.S. immigration oﬃcials to be
“experts on Chinese law and customs.”50 Writing in the 1970s, a judge tasked
with construing Chinese law said he felt as if he was “operating in the dark.”51
In 1978, China began to modernize its legal system in the service of economic
reform.52 What followed was a rapid increase in the economic, political, cultural,
and human linkages between the United States and China. By the early 2000s,
these linkages had generated a significant uptick in U.S. cases concerning
Chinese law. In recent years, American courts have had to construe or assess
Chinese laws governing arbitration, 53 banking, 54 competition, 55 contracts, 56

49 See, e.g., Louknitsky v. Louknitsky, 266 P.2d 910, 911 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (“There being
no evidence concerning the applicable laws of China or of Hongkong [sic] . . . , those laws are presumed
to be the same as the laws of California.”); Indus. Exp. & Imp. Corp. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corp., 77 N.Y.S. 2d 541, 544 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (assuming that “general principles” concerning commercial
transactions prevail in China); cf. Miller, supra note 8, at 635 (“Perhaps the oldest and most convenient
device for bypassing the need to prove foreign law . . . is the postulate that when the principle of law at
issue is ‘rudimentary,’ it can be presumed to subsist in all civilized jurisdictions.”).
50 Tillinghast v. Chin Mon ex rel. Chin Yuen, 25 F.2d 262, 266 (1st Cir. 1928) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting). For many during this period, Chinese law epitomized “foreignness” in foreign law. Cf.
Goldman v. Mollen, 191 S.E. 627, 632 (Va. 1937) (“Jewish law, as such, is no more to be followed in
Virginia than is Chinese law.”).
51 Lau v. Kiley, 410 F. Supp. 221, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
52 See STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 2 (1999).
53 See Apple & Eve, LLC v. Yantai N. Andre Juice Co., 499 F. Supp. 2d 245, 250-51 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (determining the validity of an arbitration clause under Chinese law); Slinger Mfg. Co. v.
Nemak, S.A., No. 08-0656, 2008 WL 4425889, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 24, 2008) (applying the
Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China).
54 See Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Dong, No. 11-2183, 2013 WL 4046380, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2013)
(noting concerns over contravening China’s Banking Law); Wurtz v. Bank of China Ltd., 942 F. Supp.
2d 452, 463-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (interpreting Chinese bank secrecy laws); Samsun Logix Corp. v. Bank
of China, No. 105262/10, 2011 WL 1844061, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 12, 2011) (citing an expert affidavit
discussing Chinese commercial bank disclosure laws).
55 See Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., Nos. 14-4988, 15-0986, 2015 WL 2380061, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May
14, 2015) (assessing whether article 42 of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law serves as a blocking statute).
56 See Slinger Mfg., 2008 WL 4425889, at *4 (applying “[g]eneral PRC contract law”); CPM
Indus., Inc. v. Fayda Chems. & Minerals, Inc., No. 15996, 1997 WL 770683, at *2, *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26,
1997) (citing an expert affidavit opining that Chinese law gave one party authority to bind another to
an exclusive agreement).
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corporations, 57 criminality, 58 export, 59 family relations, 60 foreign exchange, 61
foreign investment, 62 jurisdiction, 63 privilege, 64 procedure, 65 securities, 66
service of process, 67 state secrets, 68 tortious conduct, 69 and intellectual
property.70
57 See Wang v. Beta Pharma, Inc., No. 14-01790, 2015 WL 5010713, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 24, 2015)
(determining whether the Chinese Company Law precluded a party from providing relief); InStep
Software, LLC v. InStep (Beijing) Software Co., No. 11-03947, 2012 WL 1107798, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
29, 2012) (concluding from Chinese Company Law that a party was a “juridical person”).
58 See United States v. Xu, No. 02-0674, 2008 WL 1315632, at *5 (D. Nev. Apr. 10, 2008)
(interpreting fraud-related provisions of the Chinese Criminal Law).
59 See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 553-67 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (interpreting
Chinese export regulations); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Mineral Imp. & Exp.
Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320, 441-452 (D.N.J. 2010) (analyzing export-related working rules, notices,
and measures issued by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce), vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal
Sci. Prods. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
60 See In re Marriage of Song & Ye, No. H030253, 2007 WL 1475843, at *5-7 (Cal. Ct. App. May
22, 2007) (interpreting Chinese marriage law).
61 See Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals Int’l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co.,
179 F. Supp. 2d 118, 139-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (determining that certain transactions violated multiple
laws governing foreign exchange in China).
62 See Guangzhou Consortium Display Prod. Co. v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 924 F. Supp. 2d
800, 812 n.7 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (citing Law on Wholly-Foreign Owned Enterprises).
63 See Huang v. Advanced Battery Techs., Inc., No. 09-8297, 2011 WL 813600, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 8, 2011) (interpreting jurisdictional provisions of the Civil Procedure Law).
64 See Wurtz v. Bank of China Ltd., 979 F. Supp. 2d 479, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (ordering
production of items “governed by Chinese privilege law”).
65 See Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co. v. Robinson Helicopter Co., No. 06-1798, 2009 WL
2190187, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009) (“[T]he Civil Procedure Law of . . . China . . . controls the
instant case.”).
66 See Rapoport v. Asia Elec. Holding Co., 88 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(discussing whether a party’s issuance of common stock violated Chinese law).
67 See Samsung Elec. Co. v. Early Bird Sav., No. 13-3105, 2014 WL 5139488, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2014) (deciding that party was not properly served under Chinese law); Chanel, Inc. v.
Zhibing, No. 09-2835, 2010 WL 1009981, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2010) (concluding on basis
of China’s Civil Procedure Law that “[s]ervice by e-mail does not appear to violate Chinese law”);
Dragas Mgmt. Corp. v. Taishan Gypsum Co., No. 11-8663, 2015 WL 10765166, at *2-4 (Va. Cir. Ct.
June 16, 2015) (assessing refusal of service under Chinese law).
68 See Meggitt (Orange County), Inc. v. Nie Yongzhong, No. 13-0239, 2015 WL 1809354, at *7-8
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015) (describing magistrate judge’s rejection of a party’s effort to seek protection
under Chinese state secrecy laws).
69 See In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 2d 249, 253 (W.D.N.Y. 2013)
(determining the kind of compensatory damage typically awarded for wrongful death under Chinese
law); Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11-1266, 2012 WL 5431013, at *3-6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2012)
(applying Chinese laws of negligence, breach of duty, and vicarious liability); Zim Integrated
Shipping Servs., Ltd. v. Belco Res., Inc., No. 07-5861, 2008 WL 1959041, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. May 2,
2008) (assessing misrepresentation, fraud, failure to warn, and strict liability under Chinese law).
70 See Nautilus, Inc. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 552, 559-61 (W.D. Tex.
2018); Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. v. UCool, Inc., No. 15-1267, 2015 WL 5591612, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 23, 2015) (interpreting copyright ownership under Chinese law); King.com Ltd. v. 6 Waves
LLC, No. 13-3977, 2014 WL 1340574, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (assessing scope of protection
under Chinese copyright law); Splitfish AG v. Bannco Corp., 727 F. Supp. 2d 461, 465-66 (E.D. Va.
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American jurists have also had to evaluate Chinese law, either systemically
or with respect to specific remedies. Generally, courts in the United States will
not dismiss a suit to another forum for forum non conveniens if they deem the
foreign forum inadequate, nor will they recognize a foreign judgment rendered
in a judicial system lacking in impartial tribunals.71 The modern trend is to hold
that Chinese laws and institutions mostly satisfy these baseline standards for
due process.72 But courts have sometimes declared the adequacy prong unmet
when Chinese law did not appear to afford an effective remedy or if the moving
parties failed to sufficiently show adequacy.73
American judges have had to consult a panoply of Chinese legal sources.74
Such sources include, at the apex, national-level laws such as the Civil Procedure
Law.75 At a level lower, they include implementing regulations issued by the State
Council, China’s chief administrative authority. 76 Courts have also looked to
various forms of judicial guidance. These include the Supreme People’s Court’s
(SPC) judicial interpretations—quasi-legislative guidance documents issued by
China’s highest court77—as well as more familiar forms of judicial guidance, from

2010) (finding that plaintiff owns copyright “as a matter of Chinese law”); cf. Fairchild Semiconductor
Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89-98 (D. Me. 2008)
(determining whether to exercise jurisdiction despite “complexities of Chinese patent law”).
71 For a more extensive discussion of these doctrines, see infra Section I.C.
72 See, e.g., Zheng v. Soufun Holdings, Ltd., No. 15-1690, 2016 WL 1626951, at *4 (N.D. Ohio
Apr. 25, 2016) (noting that “the United States Supreme Court and several federal courts have found,
in similar cases, that the Chinese courts provide an adequate alternative forum” and listing cases);
Folex Golf Indus., Inc. v. China Shipbuilding Indus., Corp., No. 09-2248, 2013 WL 1953628, at *4
(C.D. Cal. May 9, 2013) (asserting that “U.S. courts consistently acknowledge the adequacy of due
process in the PRC judicial system” and listing cases), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Folex Golf Indus.,
Inc. v. O-Ta Precision Indus. Co., 603 F. App’x 576 (9th Cir. 2015); see also King.com, 2014 WL 1340574,
at *3 (similar); New Classic Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Haining Nice Link Home Furnishings Co.,
No. 12-0125, 2012 WL 13015017, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012) (similar).
73 See RF Micro Devices, Inc. v. Xiang, No. 12-0967, 2013 WL 5462295, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept.
30, 2013) (finding that the defendant provided “insufficient evidence . . . that China would provide
an adequate forum”); Am. Induction Techs. v. KBK, Inc., No. 11-0350, 2012 WL 12888112, at *10 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 17, 2012) (noting that a party “may not be able to obtain an effective remedy in Chinese
courts”); Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equip., Inc., No. 07-5248, 2008 WL
11398913, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2008) (“[T]he Court is concerned that China may not provide an
adequate remedy for Plaintiff ’s intentional interference with a contract claim.”).
74 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 44.1 permits federal judges to consider “any relevant
material or source” when determining foreign law. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
75 See, e.g., Chanel, Inc. v. Zhibing, No. 09-2835, 2010 WL 1009981, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar.
17, 2010) (noting that service of process by email does not violate Chinese law).
76 See Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. v. UCool, Inc., No. 15-1267, 2015 WL 5591612, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015) (citing Regulations on Computer Software); Splitfish AG v. Bannco Corp.,
727 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (E.D. Va. 2010) (cross-referencing the Chinese Copyright Law with the
Computer Software Protection Regulations).
77 Nautilus, Inc. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 552, 559-60 (W.D. Tex. 2018)
(stating that “the appropriate sources of law are the statutory Patent Law, the Implementing Regulations
of the Patent Law, and Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) Interpretations of Law” (emphasis added)).
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ordinary judgments, which do not bind, to guiding cases, which are meant to have
more authority.78 Several judges have even invoked the Chinese Constitution,79
which Donald Clarke once called “perhaps the least important document . . . in
the entire Chinese system.”80 More on that to come.
For a taste of how American judges have had to wade into knotty questions
of Chinese law, consider the case of Nautilus, Inc. v. ICON Health and Fitness,
Inc., a patent suit filed in the Western District of Texas.81 Judge Royce Lamberth
begins his analysis by reciting the diverse sources of Chinese law that govern his
analysis: The Law on Choice of Law for Foreign Related Civil Relationships;
the Patent Law; Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues
Relating to Application of Law to Adjudication of Cases of Patent Disputes; and
the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning
the Application of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Case.82 He
then considers what weight to accord Chinese judicial decisions. He concludes
that while guiding cases of the SPC have “precedential value,” other decisions
do not.83 Later in his decision, he cites to the Intellectual Property Bureau of
Shantou, a city in Guangdong province.84 “To be clear, the Shantou Intellectual
Property Bureau’s reasoning is in no way binding on this Court,” he clarifies, “But
it is persuasive.”85
Another important aid to determining foreign law is testimony from foreign
law experts. Parties appearing in American courts have often retained
established American scholars of Chinese law, including those based at
Harvard, 86 NYU, 87 Georgetown, 88 George Washington University, 89 the
78 See Note, Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2213,
2224 (2016). Guiding cases are SPC-selected cases from any level of the judiciary that judges are
expected to cite where relevant (though not as an independent source of law but rather as a “necessary
aid to judicial reasoning”). See id. The system has been unevenly implemented. Id. at 2226-28.
79 See Trans Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 280, 28384 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1542-43 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
80 Donald C. Clarke, Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When Is a Riddle Just a Mistake, in
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEROME A. COHEN 93, 103
(C. Stephen Hsu, ed., 2003).
81 304 F. Supp. 3d at 559-61.
82 Id. at 560-61.
83 Id. at 561-62.
84 Id. at 564.
85 Id. (emphases added).
86 See Declaration of William P. Alford at 1, Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (No. 10-9471), 2011 WL 13114893.
87 See Court Filed Expert Resume of Jerome A. Cohen at 26, Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v.
China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 842 (D.N.J. 2008) (No. 054376), 2008 WL 8224019.
88 Declaration of Professor James V. Feinerman at 1, In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 279 F.R.D.
90 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06-1738), 2009 WL 5133516 .
89 Declaration of Donald Clarke at 1, In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig.,
2020 WL 836348 (E.D. La. Feb. 20, 2020) (No. 09-6530), 2016 WL 8539414.
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University of Pennsylvania,90 and UCLA.91 Parties have also enlisted prominent
scholars based in Mainland or Greater China: Peking University,92 Tsinghua
University, 93 Renmin University, 94 the University of Hong Kong, 95 and the
Chinese University of Hong Kong. 96 Expert rosters have also included
practitioners from major Chinese law firms, including King and Wood
Mallesons,97 the Global Law Office,98 and Jun He.99
Foreign law experts have played a substantial role in helping judges probe
the fairness of China’s legal system. In forum non conveniens cases, experts
routinely duel over whether parties will receive a fair shake in Chinese court.
For every report asserting that “Chinese law comprehensively protects”
relevant rights and “would provide . . . a fair trial,” there is another asserting
that “[m]eaningful judicial independence does not exist in China.”100 Parties
contesting adequacy have also cited public announcements of the Supreme
People’s Court, as well as declarations of lawyers who have sought and failed
to file suit in China.101 In the foreign judgments recognition setting, parties
have sometimes relied on State Department country reports and travel notices
warning of judicial corruption, Party interference, and lawyer harassment.102
90 Declaration of Jacques deLisle at 1, In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., No. 09-0961
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2013), 2013 WL 8104169.
91 Declaration of Randall Peerenboom in Support of Yb’s Motion to Dismiss for a Forum of
Non Conveniens at 1, BP Chems. Ltd. v. Yankuang Grp. Boyang Foreign Econ. & Trade Co., No. 038167 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2004), 2004 WL 3717191.
92 Declaration of Zhipan Wu at 1, Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No.
10-9471), 2011 WL 13115459.
93 Declaration of Professor Xin Tang at 1, SEC v. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., 940 F.
Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 11-0512), 2012 WL 12135758.
94 Affidavit of Prof. Dr. Liu Junhai at 1, In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 2047 (E.D. La. May 4, 2012), 2012 WL 3061667.
95 Donald Lewis Expert Rebuttal Report to Report of Ling Bing at 8, Southgate Master Fund,
LLC v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 596 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 06-2335), 2008 WL 8200023.
96 Expert Report of Ling Bing at 2, Southgate Master Fund, 651 F. Supp. 2d 596 (No. 06-2335),
2008 WL 6626542.
97 Then known as King & Wood. See Declaration of Mr. Liu Yuwu at 1, Apple & Eve, LLC v.
Yantai N. Andre Juice Co., 499 F. Supp. 2d 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 07-0745), 2007 WL 5444962.
98 Declaration of Meph Jia Gui in Support of Defendant 6waves LLC’s Motion to Dismiss on
Forumnon [sic] Conveniens Grounds at 1, King.com Ltd. v. 6 Waves LLC, 2014 WL 1340574 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (No. 13-3977), 2013 WL 9586151.
99 Expert Witness Statement of Xiaolin Zhou, Genscript USA, Inc. v. Geneweiz, Inc., No.
6640-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 28, 2014), 2014 WL 7666393.
100 CYBERsitter, LLC v. People’s Republic of China, No. 10-38, 2010 WL 4909958, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 18, 2010) (alteration in original).
101 See, e.g., Tang v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., No. 09-0088, 2010 WL 1375373, at *6-8 (D. Md.
Mar. 29, 2010).
102 See, e.g., Armadillo Distrib. Enters., Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical Instruments Mfr. Co., No. 121839, 2014 WL 2815943, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2014) (“[Plaintiﬀ] references the [U.S. State
Department] 2013 Country Report on Human Rights Practices . . . to support its contention that
China lacks ‘fair public tribunals’ and ‘due process in judicial proceedings.’”).
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Cases involving Chinese law concentrate in certain hubs of the judiciary.
The vast majority are heard in federal court.103 Within the federal system,
district courts play a primary role in adjudicating questions of foreign law.
Based on the statistics compiled earlier, the ﬁve district courts with the most
exposure to Chinese law are the Southern District of New York, the Central
District of California, the Northern District of California, the Eastern
District of New York, and the Northern District of Illinois.104 These courts
exercise jurisdiction over the most populous commercial centers in the
country, including New York City, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Chicago.
All to say, their more cosmopolitan dockets are not unexpected.
C. Application of Foreign Law
Judges encounter foreign law in a variety of settings. Commonly, foreign
law will enter a case following a choice-of-law analysis.105 When two or more
countries have a meaningful connection to a dispute, but their laws differ
as to a relevant issue, the court must decide which country’s law to apply.
The court’s decision will be guided by any number of choice-of-law rules,
which can vary by state and cause of action. Today, some states still follow
the traditional lex loci (“law of the place”) rules of the First Restatement, at
least in some areas; most others apply the “significant relationship” test of
the Second Restatement; and still others conduct a “government interest”
analysis.106 The details of these rules are less important for our purposes
than the fact that they exist, and that in an age of vibrant cross-border
activity, conflicts principles will often bring authoritarian laws before an
American court.107
Many points of domestic law can also turn upon the meaning of foreign
law.108 To grant a divorce petition, judges must typically determine whether the
marriage was valid.109 For those married abroad, the marriage laws of their home

103 Of the 3960 composite China-related search hits in Westlaw on July 23, 2019, 3326 were
cases heard in federal court.
104 The composite case count as of July 23, 2019 is as follows: S.D.N.Y. (406); C.D. Cal. (186);
N.D. Cal. (130); E.D.N.Y. (99); and N.D. Ill. (70).
105 See NISHITANI, supra note 8, at 6.
106 See CLYDE SPILLENGER, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-23, 95-102, 106-20 (2015);
Peter Hay, The United States: The Use and Determination of Foreign Law in Civil Litigation in the United
States, in NISHITANI, supra note 8, at 401-02.
107 See, e.g., Godbey v. Frank E. Basil, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 775, 776-77 (D.D.C. 1985) (determining
that Saudi law applies to plaintiﬀ ’s contract and tort claims).
108 See, e.g., Hans W. Baade, The Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429, 448
(1995) (previewing the role of “foreign public law as datum”). For a helpful list of other doctrines,
see Zachary D. Clopton, Judging Foreign States, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2016).
109 See Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 219, 228 (2017).
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countries generally govern.110 Eugene Volokh describes a divorce case,111 not at
all atypical, in which a Louisiana court looked to Iranian law to determine
whether a couple was validly married.112 Foreign authoritarian law issues can also
arise in cross-border litigation. A party might seek to suppress a foreign
deposition on the ground that it did not comply with local law,113 or move to
limit discovery of evidence abroad for fear of violating foreign state secrecy
laws.114 The same story unfolds in immigration law. Circuit courts have vacated
orders where the immigration judge “may have erred” in their understanding of
foreign law.115 In asylum cases, judges have scrutinized the text of foreign laws
to determine whether they contemplate conduct “performed by force.” 116
Petitioners have lost cases after failing to submit proper “proof” of law.117
The modern practice, operative in most state courts and in federal court,
is to treat foreign law not as a fact to be pleaded and proven, but as law, to be
determined by a judge. 118 Federal Rule of Procedure 44.1, which has been
adopted by a number of states,119 provides that:
A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country’s law must give
notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining foreign law, the court
may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or
not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.120

Rule 44.1 empowers federal judges to consult independently a range of
sources when considering foreign law. 121 But given caseloads, expertise

See id.
Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So. 2d 731 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
Id.; see also Volokh, supra note 109, at 228.
See Popular Imports, Inc. v. Wong’s Int’l, Inc., 166 F.R.D. 276, 277-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(seeking suppression of voluntary depositions taken on Chinese soil because “the unsworn
depositions were illegal” under Chinese law).
114 See Autodesk, Inc. v. ZWCAD Software Co., No. 14-1409, 2015 WL 1928184, at *3-9 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 27, 2015) (denying protective order where moving party failed to prove that subject matter
was covered by Chinese state-secrets law).
115 Lian v. Gonzales, 201 F. App’x 808, 810 (2d Cir. 2006).
116 Xian Ming Jiang v. Holder, 430 F. App’x 39, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2011).
117 Xiao Hong Fu v. Gonzales, 241 F. App’x 713, 714 (2d Cir. 2007).
118 See Hay, supra note 106, at 405. For a thorough account of the transition away from a “fact”
approach to determinations of foreign law, see Miller, supra note 8.
119 See, e.g., MASS. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
120 FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
121 See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note (“The court may have at its disposal
better foreign law materials than counsel have presented, or may wish to reexamine and amplify
material that has been presented by counsel in partisan fashion or in insuﬃcient detail.”).
110
111
112
113
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deﬁcits, and the adversarial setting in general, judges typically rely on sources
cited in expositions of foreign law provided by the parties or their experts.122
Finally, courts must sometimes evaluate foreign law or institutions as well.
Judges may have to assess foreign laws while managing discovery123 or while
considering forum selection clauses, stays, and antisuit injunctions.124 Perhaps
the most common “evaluative” doctrines in the authoritarian law setting are
those concerning forum non conveniens and foreign judgments recognition. A
party can defeat a forum non conveniens motion by arguing that the
alternative forum is inadequate, either because the remedies available in the
alternative forum are unsatisfactory,125 or because that forum’s legal system as
a whole is too broken or corrupt.126 Similarly, parties can persuade a court to
refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment either by pointing
to deficiencies in the foreign proceeding,127 or by showing generally that the
foreign judicial system “does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”128 Courts are likelier
to reject forum non conveniens arguments or to make “inadequacy”
determinations when the alternative forum is not a liberal democracy.129
II. THE DISTINCT CHALLENGE OF ILLIBERAL LAW
To show why authoritarian law presents a special problem, I begin by
outlining the sorts of challenges associated with foreign law in general. Such
problems, though challenging in their own right, tend to stress only legal
diﬀerences that vary within a speciﬁc notion of modernist legality. That is, we
tend to assume that—whatever the diﬀerences between System A and System

122 See Pollack, supra note 8, at 471 (1978) (“We have quite a few things to do besides decoding
the Codigo Civil.”).
123 See Clopton, supra note 108, at 17 (noting that courts will sometimes factor their substantive
evaluations of foreign laws limiting discoverability into how they manage discovery noncompliance).
124 See id. at 19; see also TSMC N. Am. v. Semiconductor Mfg. Int’l Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 328,
331 (Ct. App. 2008) (affirming denial of motion for antisuit injunction pertaining to court in Beijing).
125 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
126 See, e.g., Guimei v. Gen. Elec. Co., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 187-88 (Ct. App. 2009) (describing
how plaintiﬀs painted a stark picture of the Chinese legal system).
127 See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 604-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (refusing
to recognize Ecuadorian judgment due to perceptions of corruption and fraud).
128 UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UFCMJRA)
§ 4(b)(1), 13 pt. 2 U.L.A. 26 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005). A majority of states have enacted a
version of the UFCMJRA. See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1464-65 (2011).
129 See Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum in the Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 513, 537-39 (2009) (comparing ﬁndings of
adequacy); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
481, 525 (2011) (comparing overall dismissal rates).
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B—both involve something called “law,” which, deﬁned minimally enough,
all systems share.
Authoritarian legal systems, I will show, have a systematic tendency to defy
modernist concepts of legality. Documents that resemble laws in form may
carry little such authority in practice. In other areas, prescripts lacking in the
trappings of legality may nevertheless bind with the force of law. As for courts,
the institutional cornerstones of modernist law, a stated commitment to
neutral decisionmaking may be nothing more than pretense. These deviations
from modernism can unsettle basic assumptions about legality, raising a
number of novel and underappreciated questions of legal interpretation.
Two additional problems bear mention. First, authoritarian legal systems
today can be bifurcated, in that some areas of law may evince deviations from
modernism while other areas may otherwise conform. Second, judges called to
interpret the laws of a foreign authoritarian system might themselves be biased
in ways that inhibit accurate interpretation. Both problems—bifurcation and
bias—are in their own ways distinct to autocratic law, and so present their own
set of interpretive difficulties.
A. The Modernist Paradigm of Foreign Law
When a judge interprets another country’s laws, she must have in mind a
set of basic assumptions about what law is and how law works. Deﬁned
minimally enough, these assumptions are shared between judges across the
spectrum of modern legal systems. In this common paradigm, “law” consists
of written rules enacted by the state pursuant to recognized procedures; these
rules more or less conform with Lon Fuller’s principles of legality for guiding
conduct, that is, they are general, public, prospective, consistent,
understandable, stable, and roughly congruent with their implementation130;
and such rules are enforced within a triadic model of institutionalized dispute
resolution, based upon a neutral application of specialized reasoning.131 The
130 See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 46-91 (1964). Fuller believed that for law to
serve its essential function of guiding behavior, it must minimally conform to eight principles: the rules
must be expressed in general terms; the rules must be publicly promulgated; the rules must be
prospective; the rules must be expressed in understandable terms; the rules must be consistent with each
other; the rules cannot require conduct outside of the capabilities of those affected; the rules cannot be
altered so often as to frustrate reliance; and the rules as implemented must be congruent with the rules
as written. See id. Other theorists have described similar principles as constituting basic conditions for
“the rule of law.” See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 8 n.27 (1997) (emphasizing five elements of the Rule of Law that are “in spirit
consistent with . . . Lon Fuller’s account of eight criteria”); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue,
in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 214, 214-15 (Joseph Raz ed., 1979)
(arguing that “all laws should be prospective, open, and clear” and that “laws should be relatively stable”).
131 Martin Shapiro describes a triadic model of conﬂict resolution as “[s]o universal across both
time and space . . . that we can discover almost no society that fails to employ it.” MARTIN
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paradigm is crosscutting in that many illiberal systems that deviate from this
paradigm may still speak of it as normatively appealing or characteristic of
their law.132 For that reason, I will sometimes refer to this as the “universalist”
or “modernist” conception of law.
For a sense of how the paradigm underlies common thinking on foreign
law interpretation, consider the late Judge Milton Pollack’s exhortation that
federal judges need not fear foreign law:
Of course, arguing foreign law is more complex than when the law is
domestic . . . . Yet, if what is relied upon is law, and not some primitive
religion or the whim of a tyrant, the form of reasoning will be familiar. In
civil law countries, the express language of statutes may be entitled to
more weight than we give it, and judicial decisions to less—but the law is
still proved by pronouncements of suitably constituted authorities. I am
told that in Mexico a single decision construing a statute has no
precedential effect, but that a line of consistent decisions has. That’s not
our rule, but the notions of precedent and construction are familiar, and
an American court can understand and apply the Mexican rule if it is called
to the court’s attention.133

Judge Pollack begins by assuming there is something called “law,” common
across countries, that can be accessed through a “form of reasoning” shared
across legal systems. He does not deﬁne “law,” but he understands it to consist
of “statutes” and other “pronouncements of suitably constituted authorities,”
especially “judicial decisions.” Judge Pollack also tells us what law is not: a
“primitive religion or the whim of a tyrant.” Law must therefore have
properties that ancient superstitions and dictatorial whims lack—stability
probably, and consistency, generality, congruence—qualities that would seem
to approximate some version of Fuller-ian legality.
The modernist paradigm sketches only a thin outline of a system. The
details that ﬁll this outline can vary greatly—lawmakers can be centralized
legislators or a diﬀuse community judges; laws can be organized as codes or
statutes or in case reporters; judges can be passive or inquisitorial; religion
SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1981). Jeremy Waldron argues
that all legal systems must include courts, deﬁned as “institutions that apply norms and directives
established in the name of the whole society to individual cases, that settle disputes about the
application of those norms, and that do so through the medium of hearings.” Jeremy Waldron, The
Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 20 (2008). Many theorists consider neutral courts to
be essential to the “rule of law.” See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 130, at 9 (highlighting the need for courts
as “instrumentalities of impartial justice”); Raz, supra note 130, at 216-17 (listing judicial
independence as a criterion).
132 Of course liberal systems may also fall short of the paradigm, which functions here as an
ideal-type concept.
133 See Pollack, supra note 8, at 474.
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can play various roles in the state administration of law; and informal means
of dispute resolution may coexist alongside formal law.
When judges articulate difficulties raised by foreign law, they tend to
highlight differences that fall within the ambit of these variations. Consider the
question of how common-law judges ought to relate to civil law systems—a
longstanding problem in the field.134 Can American judges accurately apply
continental law?135 How much weight should be accorded to statutes, judicial
decisions, or treatises?136 Are the two systems close enough as to preclude the
need for experts?137 Though unquestionably important, these questions do not
unsettle the modernist equilibrium. One can parse distinctions between civil
and common law without departing from the thin outline of legality shared in
theory between both systems.138
Consider next the problem of legal-cultural translation: How do judges
capture the nuance of laws promulgated in a diﬀerent legal setting, often in a
diﬀerent language? On one end is Justice Holmes’ despair-laden description
of the Puerto Rican legal system as appearing to him a “wall of stone, every
part even with all the others,” except where his “own local education” revealed
the “subordinations to which [he was] accustomed.”139 On the other end is
Judge Richard Posner’s conviction that judges rarely require expert testimony

134 See E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931) (“The extent of our
right to make any assumptions about the law of another country depends upon the country and the
question involved; in common-law countries we may go further than in civil law . . . .”); OTTO C.
SOMMERICH & BENJAMIN BUSCH, FOREIGN LAW: A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 120-21
(1959) (“Honesty requires admission on the part of bench and bar alike of relative unfamiliarity with
the laws of civil code countries . . . .”); Wilson, supra note 8, at 890-91 (predicting that “adjudicators
trained in common law jurisprudence are likely to be less comfortable looking at the application of
law formulated in a civil system”).
135 Compare Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102, 106 (1923) (Holmes, J.) (describing how the
“varying emphasis, tacit assumptions, unwritten practices” in a civil law system renders it
exceedingly diﬃcult to understand for an outsider), with Pollack, supra note 8, at 474 (stating that
he is “less pessimistic than Justice Holmes”).
136 See, e.g., Ancile Inv. Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 538 F. App’x 19, 21 & n.2 (2d Cir.
2013) (addressing party’s argument based on the “limited role of precedent in the Brazilian legal
system,” which follows “civil law”). This issue can also arise domestically when federal courts
interpret Louisiana or Puerto Rican law. See, e.g., In re Orso, 283 F.3d 686, 695 (5th Cir. 2002)
(describing how Louisiana state “court decisions . . . [lack] stare decisis precedential eﬀect”); In re
San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 687 F. Supp. 716, 726 (D.P.R. 1988) (explaining how in
the Puerto Rican civil law system, the work of tratadistas, or treatise-writers, “may even be more
inﬂuential than a court decision”).
137 See Bodum USA Inc. v. La Cafetière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 633-38 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (arguing that judges need not rely on experts to interpret foreign law).
138 Cf. In re Angeles Roca First Judicial Dist. Phila. Cty., 173 A.3d 1176, 1201-202 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
2017) (Donohue, J., dissenting) (“Most nomocratic nations, i.e., nations that adhere to the rule of
law, follow one of two major legal traditions that act to cabin the discretion of judges: the civil law
system or the common law system.”).
139 Diaz, 261 U.S. at 106.
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to accurately determine foreign law.140 Despite their diﬀerences, both judges
subscribe to modernism. Justice Holmes, in the above quotation, did not
suggest that Puerto Rican law deﬁed foundational principles of legality, only
that variations in “emphasis in the reading of ” the Puerto Rican civil code
could lead to diﬀerent interpretations. 141 Meanwhile, Judge Posner’s
modernist assumptions shine through in his faith that judges are wellequipped to interpret most all foreign laws. After all, he says, “judges are
experts on law.”142
Some caveats. I do not claim that all judges believe that law everywhere
satisfies basic conditions of modernism. Nor do I claim that law anywhere
satisfies a pure version of the modernist ideal. But given that one cannot
interpret foreign law without some preexisting conception of what law is, it
behooves us to understand what that concept might be. My claim is that
American judges commonly default to a framework that resembles the thin
sketch of legality outlined in the modernist paradigm (if not something more
substantively demanding143). As a result, accounts of the challenges of foreign
law tend to focus on systemic variations within a modernist framework.
Understudied and misunderstood are the interpretive challenges posed by legal
systems that depart from modernist legality.
B. Authoritarian Legality
In illiberal nations, departures from modernism are often driven by a
coherent authoritarian logic. When it comes to law, autocrats face a basic
existential dilemma—how to extract the beneﬁts of modernist legality
without empowering courts and activists to challenge the core interests of the
regime. Though solutions to this dilemma vary among countries, the resulting
departures from modernism tend to be similar—written “laws” that do not
bind, hidden norms that do, and “courts” that bend to political interests.
1. The Logic of Authoritarian Legality
For the rational autocrat, law can serve a number of important goals.144
Perhaps the most conventional such goal is social control. Courts assist the
regime in “maintain[ing] order and . . . sidelin[ing] political opponents,”
either alone or in concert with other supervisory instruments—parties, police,

See Bodum, 621 F.3d at 633 (Posner, J., concurring).
Diaz, 261 U.S. at 106.
Bodum, 621 F.3d at 633 (Posner, J., concurring).
See infra Section II.C (discussing liberal biases).
For an overview of the literature on authoritarian legality, see generally Tamir Moustafa,
Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 281 (2014).
140
141
142
143
144
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and military.145 Relatedly, law can also ﬁgure into social management, guiding
conduct and directing disgruntled citizens away from protest and into
courtrooms.146 With stability comes predictability, helping to signal credible
commitments to investors.147 Modern autocracies are well attuned to the link
between secure property and contract rights and economic growth, especially
in a world of mobile capital. 148 Better enforced laws can also help police
wayward bureaucrats and other actors,149 empowering citizens to check local

145 See Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, Introduction to RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF
COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 4-5 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008)
[hereinafter RULE BY LAW] (discussing examples from the Soviet Union, Brazil, Chile, Argentina,
Turkey, and Iran). Stalinist show trials, for instance, “utilized courts for political education . . . ,
employing the form of law without any autonomy given to courts.” Id. at 4.
146 See Benjamin L. Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality? Historical Legacies and Legal Reform, in
MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
165, 168 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011) (asserting that Chinese “law is also being
used to create new norms” in such areas as employment law and intellectual property); Benjamin L.
Liebman, Legal Reform: China’s Law–Stability Paradox, DÆDALUS, Spring 2014, at 96, 96.
147 See Moustafa & Ginsburg, supra note 145, at 8-9 (“Courts provide transparent, nominally
neutral forums to challenge government action, and hence are useful for foreign investors and trade.”).
148 Judge Richard Posner, among others, has argued that “[a] modernizing nation’s economic
prosperity requires at least a modest legal infrastructure centered on the protection of property and
contract rights.” Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD
BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 1 (1998). A number of scholars have linked greater investments in legality
to returns in economic growth. See, e.g., JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW:
LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE, AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 1-3 (2012) (arguing that Singapore
relies on strong rule-of-law scores to attract and keep global capital); YUHUA WANG, TYING THE
AUTOCRAT’S HANDS: THE RISE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 48-49 (2015) (contending that
China has adopted a “partial” rule of law to woo politically unconnected interest groups who control
valuable mobile assets); Jacques deLisle, Law and the China Development Model, in IN SEARCH OF
CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT MODEL: BEYOND THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 147, 148 (S. Philip Hsu et
al. eds., 2011) (arguing that “law has occupied . . . a striking, unprecedented place” in China’s
“design for economic progress with political stability”); James V. Feinerman, New Hope for Corporate
Governance in China?, 2007 CHINA Q. 590, 590 (pointing to better corporate governance as a “vital
link in bringing capital to China”); Tamir Moustafa, Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The
Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, in RULE BY LAW, supra note 145, at 132, 133-39 (describing how
economic development was a primary reason for Egyptian judicial reforms in the late 1970s). But see
Donald C. Clarke, Peter Murrell & Susan H. Whiting, The Role of Law in China’s Economic
Development, in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375, 375-76 (Thomas Rawski &
Loren Brandt eds., 2008); Shitong Qiao & Frank K. Upham, China’s Changing Property Law
Landscape, in COMPARATIVE PROPERTY LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 311, 311 (Michele Graziadei
& Lionel Smith eds., 2017). Autocratic governments can also instrumentalize criminal laws in the
service of economic goals. See Margaret K. Lewis, Criminal Law Pays: Penal Law’s Contribution to
China’s Economic Development, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 371, 417 (2014) (“[R]ecent events indicate
that the PRC government not only is continuing to use criminal law in service of economic ends but
also doing so in new and varied ways.”).
149 See Moustafa & Ginsburg, supra note 145, at 7-8 (explaining that authoritarian regimes have
diﬃculty collecting information “because the typical mechanisms for discovery, such as free press
or interest groups that monitor government behavior, are suppressed to varying degrees”).
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malfeasance that deﬁes or embarrasses the political center.150 Finally, legality
can promote domestic and international legitimacy: it can give the impression
that autocratic rule is constrained,151 foster positive perceptions of leaders,152
and confer a “formal legitimacy . . . [within] the club of modernity.”153
At the heart of these functions is the idea of instrumental legality
(sometimes called “rule by law”), the notion that autocrats seek to rule
through law without themselves being constrained by it.154 The problem, of
course—indeed the basis of the autocrat’s dilemma—is that the greater the
investment in legality, the greater the risk that law will be used to undercut
the regime’s hold on power. Law then can be what William Alford terms a
“dual-edged sword.”155 Freed from constant political supervision, courts may
rule in ways opposite to regime interests.156 Buoyed by the rhetoric of “rule
of law,” lawyers and activists may use the language of law to lobby against
state policies, or even the regime itself.157 The authoritarian solution to this
150 See id. (describing how various regimes have used courts to enhance bureaucratic
compliance); see also MARY E. GALLAGHER, AUTHORITARIAN LEGALITY IN CHINA: LAW,
WORKERS, AND THE STATE 5 (2017) (explaining how the Chinese government relied on workers
to enforce its new labor regulation regime); Moustafa, supra note 148, at 139-46; Taisu Zhang & Tom
Ginsburg, China’s Turn Toward Law, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. 306, 312 (2019). But see Wei Cui, Does Judicial
Independence Matter? A Study of the Determinants of Administrative Litigation in an Authoritarian Regime,
38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 941, 993-96 (2017) (explaining that “administrative litigation may be deprived
of its signiﬁcance” because “laws that courts would enforce may be unfavorable to would-be
plaintiﬀs” and “that private parties may themselves beneﬁt from . . . a social order that is
inconsistent with the rule of law”).
151 See Moustafa & Ginsburg, supra note 145, at 5-6 (listing examples); Margaret K. Lewis,
Controlling Abuse to Maintain Control: The Exclusionary Rule in China, 43 NYU J. INT’L. L. & POL.
630, 685-87 (2011) (“The motivation at the highest level to at least be seen as responding to public
concerns regarding governmental abuse is apparent.”).
152 See Moustafa & Ginsburg, supra note 145, at 33. Legitimacy returns can exist even if new
laws are merely symbolic. See Alex L. Wang, Symbolic Legitimacy and Chinese Environmental Reform,
48 ENVTL. L. 699, 700 (2018) (discussing “the ways in which symbolic reform works in China’s
authoritarian setting”).
153 Moustafa & Ginsburg, supra note 145, at 6. Brian Tamanaha calls the rule of law “the
preeminent legitimating political ideal in the world today.” BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE
OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 4 (2004); see also Law & Versteeg, supra note 23, at 170.
154 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 8, 23
(2002) (“[R]ule by law refers to an instrumental conception of law in which law is merely a tool to
be used as the state sees ﬁt.”); TAMANAHA, supra note 153, at 91-93 (noting that “[r]ule by law carries
scant connotation of legal limitations on government”).
155 William P. Alford, Double-Edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law and Legitimacy in the People’s Republic
of China, DÆDALUS, Spring 1993, at 45, 62 (reflecting on how law can become a “legal, moral, and political
vocabulary” and courts “a singular platform from which . . . concerns might be broadcast”).
156 See Moustafa & Ginsburg, supra note 145, at 12-13.
157 See, e.g., SIDA LIU & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE
POLITICS OF LAWYERS AT WORK 2-7 (2016) (arguing that “a fraction of China’s lawyers . . . strive
in practice for the restraint of state power”); Lynette J. Chua, Pragmatic Resistance, Law, and Social
Movements in Authoritarian States: The Case of Gay Collective Action in Singapore, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
713, 714 (2012) (examining how the gay rights movement in Singapore made gains by “accept[ing]
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dilemma is not usually to retreat from law entirely, but instead to cultivate a
distinctive set of institutions and practices seeking to isolate the beneﬁts of
legality while minimizing its risks. The result is a legal system that resembles
modernist legality in some ways, but departs from it in others.
2. Departures from “Modernism”
Authoritarian law can systematically diverge from modernist legality in
several ways. These divergences trace to the state’s wariness of legal
constraints, 158 as well as fragmentations that are often associated with
authoritarian rule. For modernist judges who encounter such laws, the
interpretive problems can be both novel and vexing.
a. “Sham” Laws
An initial point of departure: authoritarian legal systems often contain
documents that present to the world as “laws” but are in practice not enforced.
The most prominent of these “laws” are constitutions. North Korea’s
Constitution promises “freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly,
demonstration, and association.”159 In reality, “North Korea is a one-party state
led by a dynastic totalitarian dictatorship.”160 Constitutions whose “provisions
are not upheld in practice” are sometimes called sham constitutions. 161
Unsurprisingly, authoritarian countries are especially likely to have them.162
Autocrats have straightforward reasons for fearing constitutional
enforcement. Constitutions tend to address questions of public power and
human rights. Naturally, eﬀorts to meaningfully enforce constitutions will
law’s discipline and control”); Mark Jia, China’s Constitutional Entrepreneurs, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 619,
633-59 (2016) (analyzing how activists leveraged state “rule of law” discourses to advocate against the
constitutionality of state policies); Liebman, supra note 146, at 171 (“The party-state’s rhetorical
commitment to legality and emphasis on popular legal education have legitimized rights-based actions
by individuals.”); Bui Ngoc Son, Constitutional Mobilization, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 113,
156-58 (2018) (discussing how LGBT activists sought to establish a constitutional basis for same-sex
marriage in Vietnam); Rachel E. Stern & Kevin J. O’Brien, Politics at the Boundary: Mixed Signals and
the Chinese State, 38 MOD. CHINA 174, 183 (2012) (discussing “boundary-pushing lawyers”).
158 William Alford observed that Chinese leaders’ “unwillingness . . . to cede major authority
to the law in a meaningful and consistent fashion has undercut the very stability, predictability,
neutrality, and autonomy that comprise the essence of legality, distinguish it from politics, and,
ultimately, constitute its particular virtue.” WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN
ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 94 (1995).
159 SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
Sept. 5, 1998, art. 67.
160 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018: NORTH KOREA (2018),
https://freedomhouse.org/country/north-korea/freedom-world/2018 [https://perma.cc/RRP8-ZUCQ].
161 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863, 880 (2013).
162 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 23, at 175-178 (presenting data showing that “authoritarian
regimes are, on the whole, more prone to sham constitutionalism than democratic regimes”).
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risk constraining state power, fettering the ultimate deciders. 163 Sham
constitutions, though, can well serve authoritarian interests. They can
appease constituencies or political opponents; they can signal policy changes,
priorities, or aspirations to a domestic or international audience; they can
“cheap[ly]” indicate facial conformity with global standards; and—even if the
rights-conferring provisions aren’t observed—they can still describe
government operations so as to coordinate state activity.164 By drawing up a
“Constitution,” calling it “law,” but then crippling its enforcement,
authoritarians can extract some of the beneﬁts of constitutions without
suﬀering the worst of their costs.
Ordinary authoritarian laws can reﬂect a similar calculus. Autocrats may
adopt laws to facially conform with international agreements or expectations,
with no intent to implement them. 165 Governments may issue rules or
policies that vary or ﬂout laws that have not been rescinded or formally
modiﬁed. 166 Other laws may be worded generally but in reality exempt
certain parties from enforcement. For example, criminal laws that purport to
govern universally may not apply or apply diﬀerently to large swaths of the
political elite.167 Or in matters of trade and investment, leaders may treat laws
“more as starting points for negotiation than as mandatory norms.”168
Sham laws can pose a serious challenge for American judges. Though
cloaked in the language of law—indeed in some cases constitutional law, the
apex of law’s dominion169—the documents described above do not conform
to modernist principles of legality. Congruence requires that there be at least
163 Modern constitutionalism traces back to the imposition of “fundamental law” upon English
governance following the Glorious Revolution. See 1 ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON
& HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT xxi
(1991). Harold Berman observed that “it is a basic postulate of the Soviet system . . . that law is
essentially a means whereby the political leadership exercises control over society.” Harold J.
Berman, The Comparison of Soviet and American Law, 34 IND. L.J. 559, 567 (1959).
164 Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES 2, 5-10 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 2014); see also Law & Versteeg, supra note
23, at 170-74.
165 Eritrea, for example, has a promulgated a detailed Electoral Law to secure a “free popular
vote.” See ERITREAN ELECTORAL LAW preamble, arts. 5, 11-12, 23-24, 41, 43. Eritrea, however, is a
“militarized authoritarian state that has not held a national election since . . . 1993.” FREEDOM
HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018: ERITREA (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/
country/eritrea/freedom-world/2018 [https://perma.cc/5UMK-W2TJ]. While local elections have
happened, they are “controlled by the ruling party.” Id.
166 See, e.g., Sijie Chen, China’s Compliance with WTO Transparency Requirement: InstitutionRelated Impediments, AMSTERDAM L.F., Spring 2012, at 25, 44-45.
167 Chinese Communist Party members have historically been disciplined through internal
party rules outside of the formal judicial system. See LUBMAN, supra note 52, at 170.
168 Donald C. Clarke, Legislating for a Market Economy, 2007 CHINA Q. 567, 569-70
(characterizing China’s 1979 Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures).
169 For example, the Chinese term for “Constitution” contains the term “law” or fa. Its preamble
describes the Constitution as possessing “supreme legal authority.” XIANFA preamble (2004).
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a reasonable amount of similarity between the laws as written and the laws
as practiced.170
Should American judges nevertheless respect superﬁcial features of
formality and apply all laws that present to the world as laws? Or should they
preliminarily seek to ascertain which laws are sham? How might they do so?
What if the issue is not oﬃcial nonenforcement, but underenforcement to the
point of dead letter? What if the issue is nonenforcement as to only certain
parties? Do the reasons for nonenforcement matter? Questions such as these
merit careful consideration.
b. Hidden “Laws”
While some authoritarian “laws” do not bind, other norms or commands
that lack the hallmarks of legality can nonetheless regulate conduct with the
force of law. For brevity, I refer to these as “hidden laws.” Many autocracies,
for example, have a practice of issuing laws and directives that are never
publicized. 171 Consider one Chinese expert’s characterization of Chinese
regulatory law:
Many oﬃcial requirements are . . . transmitted through communications
that may consist of department documents or oral directions, even including
telephone calls. It is not the form of communication that creates its binding
character, but the source and authority of the party giving the direction.
Regardless of form, to the extent that these directions come from people in
superior authority they are no less binding and obligatory on subordinates
and the companies than any other type of “law.”172

See FULLER, supra note 130, at 81-90.
See COMM. ON INT’L COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y., PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW AFTER FOUR DECADES WITH RULE 44.1 FRCP AND
CPLR 4511, at 1 (2005), https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/International_Commercial_Dispute.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G59X-7YW3] (noting that the law of some foreign countries “cannot readily be
traced into objectively veriﬁable documents such as statutes and reports of judicial decisions”);
Berman, supra note 163, at 563 (stating that “some Soviet laws are unpublished”); Chen, supra note
166, at 27 (“China’s administrative system was not designed for transparency.”); Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 651-52 (1958)
(describing “secret laws” in Nazi Germany). American courts have taken note of this too. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 220 (1942) (discussing unwritten Soviet law); Lau v. Kiley, 410
F. Supp. 221, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting that Maoist-era Chinese “[d]ecisions are not published in
any reporting system, and few outsiders have been permitted to observe any legal proceeding”). For
a discussion on the philosophical problem of “secret laws,” see generally Claire Grant, Secret Laws,
25 RATIO JURIS 301 (2012).
172 Report of Shen Sibao (Feb. 19, 2009), in Joint Appendix on Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 141, Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome
Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018) (No. 16-1220).
170
171
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In other regulatory contexts, hidden laws can sometimes take the form of
“drawer” regulations—ministry-issued rules that, “even though not labeled
secret, have not been publicly disseminated.”173 Such regulations “are kept in
a ministry oﬃcial’s drawer, removed on one occasion, and left in the drawer
on another.” 174 Many governmental units in China are known for issuing
“normative documents”—a hodgepodge of relatively informal decisions,
notices, and provisions—that are not governed by the same publicity
requirements that apply to other laws.175
Hidden laws often take the form of verbal directives.176 Such directives
may present as “administrative” notices that supplement or even contradict
written laws.177 Or they may present as direct orders for judges to rule in a
particular way—directives that would seem to subvert law rather than to
constitute it. In studies of Russia, the latter is sometimes called “telephone
law”178 or “telephone justice,”179 referring to “a practice by which outcomes of
cases allegedly come from orders issued over the phone by those with political
power rather than through the application of law.”180
Hidden laws reserve for authoritarian leaders a measure of ﬂexibility and
discretion. Indeed, “the control of privileged information is one of the crucial
factors that allow those in power to retain their power.”181 A key advantage of
drawer regulations, for example, is that they may be “applied with an
173 Michael W. Gordon, Of Aspirations and Operations: The Governance of Multinational Enterprises
by Third World Nations, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 301, 333 (1984) (describing the use of such
regulations in predemocratic Brazil); see also Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Mineral
Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320, 427 n.104 (D.N.J. 2010) (asserting that China is “still in the
process of eradicating this mode of administering Chinese law”), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
174 Gordon, supra, note 173, at 333-34.
175 Chen, supra note 166, at 44-46 (noting that normative documents are not subject to
Legislation Law publication requirements, though some local rules have progressively begun to
regulate them).
176 See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (referencing
an expert report on how “oral directives are an important component of Chinese regulatory law”),
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 837 F.3d 175 (2d
Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018).
177 See Chen, supra note 166, at 45 (describing the use of an unpublished oral “normative
document” to raise the application fee of an auto import license from 10 yuan to 40,000 yuan). One
scholar recounts a Russian oﬃcial reprimanding his subordinate for administering his written
instructions: “If I wanted you to do something, I would have called you,” he said. TIMOTHY J.
COLTON, YELTSIN: A LIFE 325 (2007).
178 Kathryn Hendley, ‘Telephone Law’ and the ‘Rule of Law’: The Russian Case, 1 HAGUE J. ON
RULE L. 241, 241 (2009).
179 See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD 274 (2015); Alena Ledeneva,
Telephone Justice in Russia, 24 POST-SOVIET AFF. 324, 324 (2008) (“telefonnoye pravo” in Russian).
180 Hendley, supra note 178, at 241.
181 Darren C. Zook, Reforming North Korea: Law, Politics, and the Market Economy, 48 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 131, 134 (2012).
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inconsistency permitted by the lack of public disclosure.”182 Published laws,
in contrast, lay bare rules that governments may wish to hide from the public,
and risk future application to unforeseen parties or circumstances.
Nonpublication can help autocrats preserve deniability, furthering the
autocratic “virtue” of “obfuscation by design.”183
Another class of rules that might be thought of as “hidden law” is party
law. Many authoritarian regimes are ruled by single parties that govern
members (and nonmembers) through party policies and regulations. These
rules do not usually purport to be positive law, and yet in many areas party
policies are so fused with state law that any serious inquiry into foreign law
may be incomplete without a discussion of what party rules require.184 Such
rules can be written or unwritten, published or unpublished, but as a parallel,
overlapping, and often overriding source of authority,185 their existence can
further complicate the modernist picture.
As with sham laws, norms or commands that lack the trappings of law can
pose serious questions for American judges. When if ever should a court
recognize an unwritten or unpublished prescript as law? Can oral commands
be law? What about party rules? Is foreign law just what officials do? Or just
what certain foreign authorities say? What if such authorities explicitly
contradict what is written in the statute books? More broadly, how should a
court deal generally with sources of law that may be unavailable or incomplete?
c. Political “Courts”
Just as authoritarian laws sometimes depart from their counterparts in
modernist legal systems, so too can authoritarian courts. In such cases, judicial
outcomes are determined not by a neutral application of specialized reasoning,
but by the consideration of nonlegal factors shaped by political interests.186

Gordon, supra note 173, at 334.
Zook, supra note 181, at 134.
See Berman, supra note 163, at 563 (observing the “serious problems in using [Soviet]
materials” when “writers and courts are bound by Party policies which are not always explicitly
stated”); Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of
Constitutional Government in China, 36 MOD. CHINA 12, 26 (2010) (“[T]o understand the operation
of constitutionalism in China, it is necessary to understand both the constitution of the PRC and
the constitution of the CCP.”).
185 See Anthony R. Dicks, Compartmentalized Law and Judicial Restraint: An Inductive View of
Some Jurisdictional Barriers to Reform, 1995 CHINA Q. 82, 96-98 (listing cases in which Chinese
Communist Party rules functionally prevailed over ordinary laws); Penelope Nicholson & Nguyen
Hung Quang, The Vietnamese Judiciary: The Politics of Appointment and Promotion, 14 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 1, 4 (2005) (asserting that in the “conception of [the Vietnamese] law-based state, Party
policy continues to be as inﬂuential as law”).
186 See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, A NEW DEAL FOR CHINA’S WORKERS? 121 (2017) (describing
how “political control of the judicial branch” has led to “lagging enforcement” in labor law).
182
183
184
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Authoritarians can inﬂuence judicial outcomes in several ways. The most
direct strategy is to intervene in individual cases—a concept introduced
earlier as “telephone justice.” In practice, many authoritarian countries have
substituted informal “telephone” interventions with permanent inﬂuence
institutions, such as party cells or committees, which can convey not only
speciﬁc instructions, but also broader expectations.187 Another favored tactic
is to install or foster loyalists within the judiciary.188 This can happen through
subtle manipulations of appointment procedures,189 or through more direct
control of appointments, promotions, and discipline via party authorities, as
in China.190 Until recently in Vietnam, every judicial candidate’s application
dossier had to include an “opinion letter from the Communist Party cell.”191
Rulers new to power may also choose to convert judges into loyalists by
rewarding favorable decisions with grants of new authorities. 192 Even
unaﬃliated judges, reading the tea leaves, may rule to favor regime interests
to further, or at least preserve, professional status.193 Other interventions are
more structural. Autocrats sometimes manipulate jurisdiction by channeling
sensitive matters into exceptional courts.194 On other occasions, governments
187 See Ledeneva, supra note 179, at 329 (“Virtually all Soviet judges were members of these
party cells and were expected to implement the directives that the party apparatus communicated
at party meetings.”). Informal interventions continue to inﬂuence Russian adjudications. See Peter
Solomon, Authoritarian Legality and Informal Practices: Judges, Lawyers and the State in Russia and
China, 43 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 351, 353-54 (2010) (describing also how judges
in Russia are pressured to “respond to external pressures” if they want to receive discretionary perks
or promotions or avoid disciplinary action).
188 See, e.g., Jennifer Widner & Daniel Scher, Building Judicial Independence in Semi-Democracies:
Uganda and Zimbabwe, in RULE BY LAW, supra note 145, at 235, 251 (describing how President Robert
Mugabe of Zimbabwe expanded the Supreme Court to include pro-government judges).
189 See Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673, 1688 (2015) (recounting
how Turkish “military leaders structured the appointments process to the [Turkish Constitutional]
Court” to ensure that pro-military interests controlled selection).
190 See WANG, supra note 148, at 68-71 (explaining that the Party’s informal rules surrounding
the appointment and removal of judges undermine the formal rules developed by the legislature).
191 Nicholson & Quang, supra note 185, at 14 (quoting Ministry of Justice & Special People’s
Court Inter-Circular No. 05/TTLN, Guiding the Ordinance on People’s Judges and Jurors, pt. III,
item 2 (Oct. 15, 1993)).
192 See, e.g., Varol, supra note 189, at 1690 (noting how Russian Constitutional Court Chair Valery
Zorkin’s “support for the Putin government . . . regained the court many of its former authorities”).
193 See Moustafa & Ginsburg, supra note 145, at 14-15 (arguing that even “reform-minded judges”
in authoritarian regimes “are acutely aware of their insecure position in the political system”).
194 See THOMAS GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 211-13 (2003) (noting how authoritarian President Park Chung-Hee of
South Korea transferred constitutional review powers to a new committee under his control);
Anthony W. Pereira, Of Judges and Generals: Security Courts under Authoritarian Regimes in Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile, in RULE BY LAW, supra note 145, at 23, 55 (discussing how authoritarian regimes
rely on “trustworthy” security courts); José J. Toharia, Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime:
The Case of Contemporary Spain, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 475, 486-95 (1975) (describing Spanish “special
tribunals” having exclusive “jurisdiction over cases which are politically conﬂictive”).
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curtail jurisdiction entirely,195 or employ more direct forms of intimidation,
such as arresting judges.196
Inﬂuence operations can fundamentally alter the nature of authoritarian
courts.197 The modernist ideal of impartial justice assumes that judges decide
legal disputes through a neutral application of specialized reasoning. Such
reasoning does not have to be legal in a narrow sense of the word; common
law courts will often explicitly consider policy, for example. But decisions that
subordinate local rules of interpretation to the interests of a party or nonparty
plainly violate impartiality.
How should American courts treat foreign judgments rendered under
extrajudicial pressure? Should they still try to predict how a foreign court
would rule in all cases, even those where foreign judges will likely be subject
to political interference? How would American judges even know? Should
they even try to know, or are considerations of expressivity and eﬃciency
better served by simply assuming modernist impartiality in all cases? And if
there is evidence of extralegal inﬂuence, are there conditions under which
such inﬂuence itself ought to be treated as law?
3. Bifurcated Legal Systems
The preceding discussion may paint a rather bleak picture of authoritarian
law. Sham constitutions, hidden laws, and political courts inspire little
conﬁdence that an American court can mentally transpose itself as a foreign
court, or at least “conceive of itself performing a parallel function.”198 The
reality, however, is that many authoritarian legal systems contain both
modernist and nonmodernist features. Indeed some borderline autocracies,
such as Singapore, evince modernist tendencies in all but a few areas.199 This
more complete picture of authoritarian law can pose its own set of linedrawing problems for American courts.

195 See GINSBURG, supra note 194, at 135-36, 211-13 (describing jurisdiction-stripping in Taiwan
and Korea); Keith Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China, 7 E. ASIA L. REV.
51, 68-69, 86 (2012) (describing how authoritarian governments in China and Taiwan eﬀectively
wrested jurisdiction over constitutional claims away from the courts).
196 See, e.g., Widner & Scher, supra note 188, at 252 (recounting how a judge on Zimbabwe’s
High Court was arrested after seeking to require a government minister to comply with a summons
to appear on contempt charges).
197 The nonjudicial functions of some authoritarian courts are well documented. See, e.g.,
Rachel E. Stern, The Political Logic of China’s New Environmental Courts, CHINA J., July 2014, at 53,
54 (listing several “judicial activities” besides dispute resolution, including “policy advocacy,
education, and social control”).
198 Slaughter, supra note 9, at 1947.
199 See RAJAH, supra note 148, at 9 (“Singapore has selectively performed emasculated facets of
the ‘rule of law,’ facets which lack the core capacity to limit state power.”).
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Scholars sometimes describe authoritarian legal systems as “dualistic” or
“bifurcated.” 200 In routine commercial, civil, and even criminal matters,
bifurcated legal systems will largely conform to modernist principles: the laws
will be mostly written, consistent, and clear, and they will be applied by
reasonably neutral and competent jurists. Yet, in matters that are more
politically consequential, written laws may yield to secret commands and
otherwise autonomous judges may begin to resemble political agents. Russian
law, for instance, is characterized by both progress in “meeting international
standards” and active state eﬀorts to “dilut[e] their eﬀect and maintain[]
control through informal practices.”201 Similarly, though Singapore’s courts
perennially top global rule-of-law charts,202 they almost invariably bend to
the ruling party’s priorities at key junctures.203 As for China, scholars have
pointed to “bifurcations” along several fault lines: between civil law and
criminal law 204 ; between commercial law and noncommercial law 205 ; and
between wealthy urban courts and poorer rural courts.206
On some level, dualistic legal systems are not new phenomena—even
older, more brittle regimes “had some regularity when dealing with nonpoliticized cases.” 207 Where many modern authoritarian states distinguish
themselves is in the sector-speciﬁc nature of the bifurcation, as well as the
sheer magnitude of the gap between sectors.208
200 See RACHEL E. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN CHINA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
AMBIVALENCE 229 (2014) (explaining that “judicial performance” and “judicial independence” are two
distinct factors at play in “bifurcated” legal systems); Hendley, supra note 178, at 260 (noting that in the
Russian legal system there are “exceptional cases in which the outcomes are manipulated to serve the
interests of the powerful” but “the vast majority of decisions . . . are made in accordance with the law”).
201 Solomon, supra note 187, at 352.
202 See, e.g., WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 20172018, at 16 (2018), https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_ROLI_2017-18_
Online-Edition_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6XM-LPP7] (ranking Singapore thirteenth in the world for
respect for the rule of law, above Japan, the United States, France, and Spain).
203 See Tushnet, supra note 23, at 403 (“Singapore’s courts regularly uphold government actions
that a more independent judiciary might question . . . .”).
204 See WILLIAM HURST, RULING BEFORE THE LAW: THE POLITICS OF LEGAL REGIMES
IN CHINA AND INDONESIA 30-32 (2018) (contrasting the minimal interventionism of Chinese civil
law with the “heavy[]” interventionism of “nonlegal actors” in Chinese criminal law”).
205 See WANG, supra note 148, at 48-49, 158.
206 See KWAI HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN
CHINA 6-14 (2017) (arguing that wealthier urban courts (“firm”-type courts) tend to value legal expertise,
while poorer rural courts (“work-unit”-style courts) consider political factors more prominently).
207 Hendley, supra note 178, at 261 (describing the Russian legal system as “dualistic”).
208 Another characteristic of some modern authoritarian countries is that their legal systems
can vary in their commitment to legality over time. For example, the Hu Jintao era of Chinese law
(2002–2012) has been characterized as a return to “populist” legality, a de-emphasizing of formal law,
even a “turn against law,” while the Xi Jinping era has been described as placing a greater emphasis
on formal rational legality. Compare Liebman, Legal Reform, supra note 146, at 96 (describing a
weakening of formal legal institutions and an increased reliance on out-of-court dispute resolution
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For American judges, such bifurcations present new problems. How do
judges distinguish between features of authoritarian legal systems that
actually adhere to modernism versus features that only do so superﬁcially?
Should foreign law interpretation itself be bifurcated, with more skepticism
towards judicial decisions in noncommercial areas of law? Should foreign law
evaluations be similarly bifurcated, with courts more willing to recognize
judgments or dismiss for forum non conveniens in certain sectors of foreign
law compared to others? Or are all of these complications instead the best
argument for embracing modernist simplicity?
4. A Caveat
While one can generalize, as I have, about differences between authoritarian
and liberal legality, no legal system perfectly conforms with the modernist
ideal. All countries—regardless of regime type—deal to varying degrees with
problems of poor implementation or judicial corruption.209 And while there are
material differences between laws that are poorly implemented and “laws” that
are actually sham—I explore this in detail below210—even liberal systems may
depart from modernism in ways that feel authoritarian. Japanese judges, for
example, can be highly deferential in politically sensitive case for fear of lower
pay, less desirable rotations, and diminished prestige. 211 In such cases, one
might still describe specific practices as “authoritarian” because they involve
punishments that the state has meted out to curb accountability institutions
that would otherwise constrain state power. 212 But of course Japan is not
authoritarian, for the system as a whole is insufficiently committed to
antiaccountability as to warrant that label. Authoritarian legal systems might

under Hu), and Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 936-37, 951
(2011) (similar), with Zhang & Ginsburg, supra note 150, at 3 (identifying an increased reliance on
formal law and strengthening of legal institutions under Xi Jinping), and Jacques deLisle, Law in the
China Model 2.0: Legality, Developmentalism and Leninism under Xi Jinping, J. CONTEMP. CHINA,
Sept. 2016, at 68, 70 (describing a “limited” return to formal legality in the Xi era). This ﬂuidity can
also pose challenges for American judges. For example, many courts often conclude that China oﬀers
an adequate forum because other courts have in the past found the same. See supra note 72. Such
reasoning falsely assumes that the quality of legal systems remains static over time.
209 See, e.g., Stratos Pahis, Note, Corruption in Our Courts: What It Looks Like and Where It Is
Hidden, 118 YALE L.J. 1900, 1925-42 (2009) (analyzing a data set of discovered incidents of judicial
bribery in the United States).
210 See infra subsection III.B.1.a.
211 See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in
Politically Charged Cases? 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331, 331-32, 334, 338-41 (2001) (concluding that
judges who rule against the government face a “career penalty”).
212 See supra Section I.A.
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therefore be thought of as crystallizing certain types of nonmodernist
departures that nonauthoritarians can nonetheless evince.213
C. Antiauthoritarian Bias
I turn finally to a different source of interpretive difficulty: the tendency
among some judges to impute false assumptions to a foreign legal system based
on the mere fact of the country’s authoritarianism. Though biases of this sort
are hard to measure, their existence can further inhibit accurate interpretation.
Antiauthoritarianism is an arguably American value. The country was
formed on the belief that a monarch’s “absolute [t]yranny” violated natural
law. 214 Ideological and military struggles against fascism and communism
have further cemented this self-concept. Consistent with this aspect of
American identity, American jurists and law scholars have often applied
antiauthoritarian concepts to foreign legal systems. Such frames encourage a
view that autocracies are essentially lawless. As Teemu Ruskola explains in
the context of Chinese law:
The United States has from its founding regarded its political values as
exemplary, not just reﬂecting the emancipatory values of the Enlightenment
on the European model but embodying them even better than Europe does,
or once did. The American system of government is thus not merely one
expression among others of the universal values of democratic rule-of-law but
their paradigmatic instance—a model for others to emulate . . . . At the
same time, insofar as China’s legal tradition grows out of an enduring
Oriental despotism, its political values are inherently suspect. Worse than
simply unlegal, they are in eﬀect antilegal.215

To illustrate, Ruskola points to the system of extraterritoriality established by
American and other Western powers in China. From 1906 to 1943,
extraterritorial jurisdiction was exercised by the United States Court for
China, a federal district court initially headquartered in Shanghai. 216
American leaders justiﬁed the court as a means of avoiding and perhaps
reforming the “despotism that allegedly inhered in the very nature of Chinese
law”.217 (And yet, as Ruskola details, the Court itself was hardly a paragon of
liberal legal virtue, applying laws that were “so ad hoc as to be lawless.”218)
213 My gratitude to William Alford for pointing me beyond dichotomous thinking, both here
and in general.
214 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (1776).
215 TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM 9 (2013).
216 See id. at 157-85 (detailing the history of the U.S. Court for China, which exercised
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens in China).
217 Id. at 162.
218 Id.
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Legal antiauthoritarianism took on a distinctly geopolitical flavor during the
Cold War. Statutes described the Communist Party as “an authoritarian
dictatorship within a republic.” 219 Justices railed against the “travesty” of
“Communist justice,” likening it to a “reign of terror.”220 Judges invoked the
“barbarity” of Chinese law to protest decisions that might “become a precedent
on which future Dracos may feed to their absolutist and tyrannical content.”221
In Zschernig v. Miller, the Supreme Court reprimanded probate courts for
interfering with federal policies through “critici[zing] nations established on a
more authoritarian basis than our own.”222 In one such case, an Oregon court
disbelieved Czechoslovakian declarations on the ground that government
declarations from “communist-controlled countries” were inherently suspect.223
Relatedly, judges have sometimes employed illiberal law as a rhetorical or
interpretive aide, to understand American law with reference to what it is
not. 224 They have invoked Russian “telephone justice” to highlight the
importance of judicial independence.225 They have criticized “[d]raconian” tax
collection measures for “appear[ing] more appropriate to an authoritarian
regime.”226 And while intrusive searches would no doubt solve more crime, “as
a number of authoritarian governments . . . have proved,” such searches
would “convert the authorities themselves from the solution into the problem,
as the same authoritarian governments have likewise proved.”227
219 Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S.C. §§ 841–844 (2018); see also Black v. Cutter
Labs., 278 P.2d 905, 912-14 (Cal. 1955) (detailing the legislative intent behind various statutes
targeting the Communist movement).
220 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 226 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(writing on the key “diﬀerences . . . between authoritarian procedure and common law”). “I
understand that people in authoritarian countries must obey arbitrary orders,” Justice Black once
wrote in dissent. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 328 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting). “I had hoped
that there was no such duty in the United States.” Id.
221 Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825, 832-33 (Pa. 1959) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
222 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968); see also id. at 437 (“As one reads the Oregon decisions, it seems that
foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the ‘cold war,’ and the like are the real desiderata.”).
223 Id. at 436 (quoting State ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Pekarek, 378 P.2d 734, 738 (Or. 1963)).
224 In constitutional law, this phenomenon is sometimes described as a “negative
comparativism.” David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539,
551 & n.59 (2001) (listing examples).
225 See, e.g., Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 2012) (Loken, J., concurring)
(“Telephone justice . . . occurred when the party boss called judges and told them how to decide
the outcome of a particular case. . . . When pervasive, this perception corrodes public trust in the
courts.” (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Independence: Remarks by Justice Breyer, 95 GEO. L.J. 903,
904-05 (2007))).
226 Fawber v. Dauphin Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, 44 Pa. D. & C.3d 13, 21 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin
Cty. 1987).
227 Ex parte Warren, 783 So. 2d 86, 96 (Ala. 2000) (Johnstone, J., concurring); see also Snider
v. State, 501 So. 2d 609, 610 (1986) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (Glickstein, J., dissenting) (arguing
that, to “residents of the numerous totalitarian and authoritarian states of our day,” occasionally
“let[ting] an oﬀender go . . . is not a great price to pay” to avoid intrusive searches).
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The accounts above raise the possibility that antiauthoritarian biases could
distort judicial interpretations of foreign laws. The concern, to be clear, is not
that judges may accurately identify “aberrational” features of authoritarian
law; I too have highlighted many such features above. The concern rather is
that judges may make false assumptions about a foreign legal system due to
the mere fact of its authoritarianism. They may sweepingly say, as Judge
Posner once did, that “little about Chinese law is certain,” when in fact there
is a fair amount of regularity in some areas of Chinese law.228 Or they may
rely upon general assumptions about autocracy to refuse a forum non
conveniens motion or deny an asylum claim despite a lack of speciﬁc
evidence. 229 “[A] priori views about how authoritarian regimes conduct
themselves are no substitute for evidence,” the Seventh Circuit once warned
in an immigration appeal.230 This is “a point we have made repeatedly, but
which has yet to sink in.”231
To the many interpretive questions posed earlier, then, I would add a few
more. How can courts realistically check antiauthoritarian biases if they exist?
Is neutrality an achievable ideal? Or, conversely, is it even desirable that
courts police such biases at all? Might treating all authoritarian laws as
something less than “law,” as Slaughter once advocated, instead promote other
normative ends in law and international society? More broadly, should courts
be more mindful that any declaration they make about law, even foreign law,
has expressive and normative value? American courts are only just beginning
to grapple with questions of this nature.
III. FORMAL AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES TO
AUTHORITARIAN LAW
American judges have approached authoritarian legal systems from two
basic vantage points. One method, which might be thought of as a kind of
formalism, focuses on the written meaning of only those prescripts that
correspond to familiar structures in modernist legal systems, primarily
published statutes. A second method stresses context and function, giving
eﬀect to whatever may be locally regarded as law, even if such laws grate
228 Xue Juan Chen v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[L]ittle about Chinese law
is certain, because China does not have the ‘rule of law’ as understood in our legal system . . . .”).
229 See, e.g., Pyrenee Ltd. v. Wocom Commodities Ltd., 984 F. Supp. 1148, 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(criticizing a District of Massachusetts case for “refusing dismissal to Hong Kong [prior to reversion]
based solely on what appears to be judicial hysteria”).
230 Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2006) (vacating denial of Liberian asylum claim).
231 Id. at 453-54 (collecting cases); see also Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 309 (2d Cir.
2003) (referring negatively to an immigration judge who based his implausibility ﬁnding on “his
own unsupported opinion as to how an authoritarian government operates” (quoting Gao v.
Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 278 (3d Cir. 2002))).
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against the prefabricated molds of modernist legality. Most judgments tend
towards formalism or functionalism; few embody them in their purest forms.
Formalism has heuristic advantages. It is easier, less resource-intensive,
and can still get autocratic law “right” much of the time. It also has expressive
value, enabling jurists to shape norms about the rule of law. But it can often
misstate foreign law when local practices or concepts of law are not reﬂected
in familiar structures. Functionalism’s heightened accuracy, on the other hand,
can require independent research or party-sponsored experts, neither of
which are available in every case. Nor is functionalism always more helpful
than formalism, given the bifurcated nature of many autocratic legal systems
and the adversarial nature of expert testimony. And taken too far,
functionalism can erode public norms about what “law” requires.
A. Formalism and Functionalism
I begin with an exposition of formalism and functionalism as methods of
interpretation. Although versions of each approach can be applied to foreign
law generally, 232 I conceive of them here as ideal-type methodologies tailored
to answering questions raised in the distinct authoritarian law setting. After
explaining each theory, I discuss two leading district court cases that
exemplify each approach.
1. Formalism
The hallmark of formalist interpretation is a scrupulous observation of
legal formality. A formalist jurist will search for legal structures and
institutions that correspond in form to her own and treat them as if they were
broadly similar to her own. Such an approach requires an uncompromising
commitment to modernist legality and a willingness to ignore evidence of
deviations or bifurcations commonly found in illiberal legal systems.
In its purest form, formalism would treat as “law” all traditional sources of
written laws within the modernist framework—constitutions, statutes,
regulations, and, as relevant, judicial decisions. The fact that a legal document,
even a constitution, may be unenforced or underenforced would be
interpretively irrelevant. So long as the document was promulgated following
commonly recognized procedures and bears the other hallmarks of positive
state law, it is “law” for a formalist judge. Formalists would for similar reasons
232 Even when construing “liberal” laws, the choice between formalism and functionalism can
yield varying interpretations. But in the authoritarian law setting, the formal–functional divide is
both more salient and more interesting. The nonmodernist departures characteristic of authoritarian
legal systems will frequently force a hard choice between formalism’s strict assumptions about
legality and functionalism’s more contextual inquiry.
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be disinclined to apply “hidden” laws that have no formal correspondences in
modernist legality. Nor would they look “behind” a judicial decision, or
countenance evidence of a “bifurcated” legal system, preserving for themselves
a useful fiction of uniform good-faith adjudication.
Formalism in the sense used here bears a family resemblance to other
formalisms in American law. Like some strains of American legal formalism,
formalism sees interpretation primarily as an exercise in deductive logic,
divorced from considerations of policy or society.233 Formalism here also shares
some of the features of constitutional “formalism.”234 By weighing text over
purpose, bright-line categories over more contextualized inquiries, formalism
here evokes constitutional formalism’s relatively rigid notions of structure.235
2. Functionalism
The second major approach to autocratic law stresses function over form.
Functionalists take a more expansive and ﬂexible view of legality, focusing on
how rules and norms operate on the ground and within their speciﬁc political,
social, and cultural context. Instead of presuming similarity, functionalists
recognize diﬀerence and give eﬀect to such diﬀerence, even to “hidden” laws,
for example, so long as there is adequate evidence that the disparate structures
function as law or are regarded locally as law. But “sham” laws, whether
constitutions, statutes, or regulations, can be ignored if context establishes
that they are practically or functionally nonlegal, regardless of how much they
conform to accepted formalities.
Functionalism as used here is closely related to functionalist
methodologies in comparative law. Comparative law functionalists assume
that “the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems,”
which are addressed through “quite diﬀerent means though very often with

233 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of American Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251,
256 (1975) (“[Legal formalism] conceive[s] of law not as a malleable instrument of . . . desires and
interests, but as a ﬁxed and inexorable system of logically deducible rules.”); Richard A. Posner,
Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 179, 181 (1986) (“I want [formalism] to mean the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome
of a case from premises accepted as authoritative.”). But see Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal
Realism: What is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111, 111 (2010) (criticizing the fact that “‘formalism’ is
sometimes associated with the idea that judicial decision-making involves nothing more than
mechanical deduction on the model of the syllogism”).
234 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1958
(2011) (characterizing formalism in part as “adher[ance] to the conventional meaning of the text instead
of resorting to the broad purposes underlying it”); see also Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional
Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 512
(1987) (contrasting formalism’s “technical positivism” with functionalism’s “policy analysis”).
235 See Manning, supra note 234, at 1950 (describing formalism as favoring rules over standards
and text over purpose).
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similar results.”236 Their goal is to understand these means in the light of their
functional purposes, to place law within “the context of the institutional,
economic and cultural pillars of each society.” 237 The resulting inquiry is
necessarily fact-driven, focusing “not on rules but on their eﬀects, not on
doctrinal structures and arguments, but on events.” 238 Functionalism here
shares many of these demythologizing assumptions. By focusing on law in
action over law as written, it is redolent of Roscoe Pound’s sociological
jurisprudence,239 and some tenets of legal realism: Justice Holmes famously
deﬁned law as “the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious.”240
3. Leading Cases: The Chinese Export Cases
To illustrate formalism and functionalism in practice, I describe below
two cases that evince some of the salient diﬀerences between them: In re
Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation 241 (“the Vitamins case”) and Animal Science
Products, Inc. v. China National Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp. (“the
Magnesite case”). 242 The decisions are natural comparisons. They involve
similar facts, similar claims, and even the same lead plaintiﬀ. And yet on the
question of how to treat foreign laws that deviate from “law” as commonly
understood, they exemplify contrasting approaches.

236 K ONRAD Z WEIGERT & H EIN K ÖTZ , I NTRODUCTION TO C OMPARATIVE L AW 31
(2d ed. 1987).
237 Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV.
INT’L. L.J. 221, 228 (1999); see also Max Rheinstein, Teaching Comparative Law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV.
615, 617-18 (1938) (“What function does [law] serve in present society?”).
238 Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 342 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
239 See generally Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2), 24
HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action,
44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); see also James Gardner, The Sociological Jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, 7 VILL.
L. REV. 1, 9 (1961) (describing sociological jurisprudence’s “attitude” as “essentially functional”).
240 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
Functionalists can also be legal pluralists, especially if there is evidence that foreign courts also give effect
to normative orders outside of centralist positive state law. See, e.g., John Griffiths, What is Legal
Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 5 (1986) (noting that colonial and postcolonial
countries often have pluralistic legal systems that incorporate “pre-existing customary law”); William
Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 473, 489-93
(2010) (describing the role of normative orders in cases arising in Sudan, Kenya, and Brazil).
241 810 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v.
Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018).
242 702 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc.
v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
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a. The Vitamins Case—A Formalist Approach
Begin with the Vitamins case, the more prominent of the two for having
reached the Supreme Court in 2018.243 The plaintiﬀs, American companies,
brought a putative class action against several Chinese vitamin C
manufacturers for allegedly engaging in an illegal cartel.244 The defendants
asserted a foreign sovereign compulsion defense, applicable when a foreign
defendant is required by their home law to engage in activities that violate
American law.245 The question was whether Chinese law in fact compelled
vitamin C exporters to ﬁx prices and output.246
The defendants were members of the Chamber of Commerce of
Medicines and Health Products Imports and Exporters, one of a number of
Ministry of Commerce-supervised entities responsible for industry
“coordination” in China.247 Under a 1997 Notice, a Chamber Subcommittee
composed of all vitamin C exporters had been charged with awarding licenses
only to companies that followed certain price and quantity restrictions. 248
Following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), this
regime was replaced with a “Price Veriﬁcation and Chop” (PVC) system,
under which the Chamber conveyed its coordinated prices and quantities to
Customs, which was then expected to limit export only to contracts that had
received a “chop” from the Chamber. 249 A revised Subcommittee Charter
described the committee as composed of “self-disciplinary industry
organization[s] jointly established on a voluntary basis.”250
Judge Cogan began his analysis by acknowledging the unusual nature of
the task before him:
At the outset, I am compelled to note that the Chinese law and regulatory
regime that defendants rely on is something of a departure from the concept of
“law” as we know it in this country . . . . [D]efendants’ own expert asserts
that oral directives are an important component of Chinese regulatory law
. . . . [I]n some circumstances, asserting a claim of compulsion under a

Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018).
Vitamin C Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
See id. at 544-45. In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, the Supreme Court held that
international comity counseled against exercising extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction when
there is a true conflict between U.S. and foreign law. 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993). The defense
reflects considerations of comity, fairness, and constitutional structure. See Vitamin C Litig., 810
F. Supp. 2d at 524.
246 Id. at 524-25.
247 See Vitamin C Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 527-28.
250 Id. at 530-31.
243
244
245
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foreign regime that so differs from our own concept of law can be akin to
trying to fit a round peg into a square hole.251

These diﬀerences notwithstanding, Judge Cogan resolved the case on the
basis of formal written law. The key provision, in his view, was language in a
2002 notice permitting the Chamber to “suspend export price review.”252 He
took the plain language of that provision “as granting defendants the
unilateral authority to suspend veriﬁcation and chop.” 253 And because a
suspension power implied no compulsion, that provision “standing alone” was
“suﬃcient reason to deny summary judgment.”254
Judge Cogan cited other formalist grounds for his ﬁnding, relying on “the
more traditional sources of foreign law—primarily the governmental
directives themselves as well as the charter documents of the Subcommittee
and the Chamber.”255 He argued, for instance, that “nothing on the face of the
governmental directives” appeared to require that companies comply with
output restrictions to receive a chop.256 In a later section, he relied on “the
plain language” of a 2002 notice to discount an “ambiguous provision.”257 He
also refused to credit a Ministry of Commerce ﬁling on the ground that “the
plain language of the governmental directive” appeared to “contradict[] the
position taken by the Ministry.” 258 Later, while acknowledging that “selfdiscipline” meant something speciﬁc to the Chinese regulatory context, Judge
Cogan nevertheless concluded that the term could not indicate coercion:
“[A]s the term ‘self-discipline’ suggests on its face,” he wrote, “defendants
were engaged in consensual cartelization.”259
b. The Magnesite Case—A Functionalist Approach
The Magnesite decision gave greater weight to functional considerations.
Plaintiﬀs there, led by one of the same parties in the Vitamins case, alleged
that seventeen Chinese manufacturers of magnesite-based products pursued
“illegal horizontal agreements” to ﬁx prices in violation of the Sherman
Act. 260 As in the Vitamins case, the Magnesite defendants argued for
Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
Id. at 555.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F.
Supp. 2d 320, 329 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
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abstention on the ground that Chinese law had mandated their price ﬁxing.261
The regulatory regime for magnesite products was strikingly similar to the
one regulating vitamin C—the defendants were also members of a Ministry
of Commerce-supervised chamber; 262 the Chamber was responsible for
coordinating industry-wide prices;263 and the Chamber had at various points
described itself as engaging in “self-discipline.”264
Like Judge Cogan, Judge Brown struggled with how to understand
nonmodernist features of Chinese law. Issues of “unwritten law,” “drawer
regulations,” and unpublished law raised similar issues of un-legality.265 But
unlike Judge Cogan, Judge Brown privileged function over form.
On what constituted “law,” for instance, he eschewed the requirement of
“writtenness”: “The Court finds Plaintiffs’ position that in order to be ‘real law,’
a mandate must be reduced to a . . . written statement issued by a
government[] unduly condescending toward foreign legal regimes structured
differently from the system used in the United States, Europe, or akin.”266
“Likewise,” he said, “it cannot be said that a prescript is not ‘real law,’ and its
violation would not result in repercussions if the prescript is merely set forth
in terms of a broad caution: not every type of prescript enacted by every legal
regime in the world is open to the constitutional challenge of vagueness.”267
And, in response to plaintiffs’ contention that a major regulation did not
explicitly authorize price setting, Judge Brown cited back to his discussion of
foreign law: “[M]any provisions are treated as ‘law’ regardless of the fact that
the delegated authority of the authors is not—or cannot—be established.”268
Judge Brown was attentive to problems of bias in other areas. In assessing
compulsion, he argued that it was “wholly illogical to factor in . . . the sociopolitical and cultural perceptions of a foreigner . . . .” 269 He seemed
particularly skeptical of relying on the plain English meaning of translated
written authorities: “[I]t would be an error to automatically qualify a foreign
prescript as non-mandatory on the grounds that a literal translation [of the]
prescript has non-compulsory connotations to an American ear in light of the
socio-political and cultural peculiarities of United States life.” 270 While the
Chamber’s use of the term “self-discipline” may connote “complete discretion”

261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270

Id. at 330.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396-97.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 427 n.104.
Id. at 424 n.100.
Id at 424.
Id. at 446 & n.132.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 425 & n.102.
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“to a Western ear,” he said, the “Chinese meaning” of the term “suggests a
disguised form of strict government compulsion.”271
Judge Brown ultimately held that Chinese law compelled defendants’
conduct.272 It is true, he conceded, that compulsion did not derive from “a
simple issuance of a single legal mandate that remained continuously
operative . . . .”273 Instead, there was in place a “legal ‘regime’ that employed
various regulatory mechanisms producing a composite eﬀect of a neverceasing correlation between the minimum price requirement and punitive
measures for non-compliance with it.”274 China’s entry into the WTO did not
change the basic nature of this regime—“[b]oth the gist and the continuum
of such regime was, seemingly, left unaﬀected” by it.275
c. Comparing the Compulsion Cases
The Vitamins and Magnesite Cases are not perfect exemplars of
formalism and functionalism. Judge Cogan also examined the factual record
to understand “how Chinese law was enforced and applied,”276 while Judge
Brown at one point questioned how useful it would be to examine the degree
of legal underenforcement in practice.277 Still, the methodological diﬀerences
are stark, well illustrating the two leading approaches to the problems of
authoritarian law.
Judge Cogan followed the plain meaning of published authorities,
vindicating the plaintiﬀs’ strategy to stress only the “plain language” of
Ministry directives and Chamber documents.278 The defendants, in contrast,
relied upon testimony from a native expert named Shen Sibao,279 as well as a
Ministry of Commerce ﬁling purporting to explain the regulatory scheme’s
function in practice. 280 Judge Cogan did not credit much of Shen’s

Id. at 436 & n.117.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See In re Vitamin C Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 550, 564-67 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir.
2016), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018).
277 See China Nat’l Metals, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 423 (“The fact that a certain . . . entity succeeds
at avoiding negative repercussions, cannot be read as a sign that the legal regime is not
compelling . . . .”). The two judges also evinced somewhat diﬀerent understandings of
“compulsion.” See Vitamin C Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d at 545.
278 Id. at 526 n.5, 542.
279 Professor Shen is a professor and the former dean of the law school at the University of
International Business and Economics in Beijing, China. Report of Professor Shen Sibao, supra note
172, at 134.
280 Vitamin C Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
271
272
273
274
275
276
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testimony,281 nor did he defer to the Chinese government’s explanation of its
own laws.282 His main analysis was literally titled, “Interpretation of Chinese
Law Based on the Traditional Sources of Foreign Law.”283
Judge Brown, on the other hand, took pains to decenter his legal
presuppositions. His approach is reminiscent of Günter Frankenberg’s view
that “the dialectic of learning” foreign law requires both “distancing” and
“diﬀerencing.”284 Distancing is “an attempt to break away from ﬁrmly held
beliefs and settled knowledge”; diﬀerencing “calls into question the neutrality
and universality of all criteria . . . .”285 Judge Brown’s call to shed the “sociopolitical and cultural perceptions of a foreigner” was an instance of distancing,
of “de-center[ing] [one’s] world-view” and striving for “objectivity.”286 His
relatively expansive conception of “law” itself was an exercise in diﬀerencing,
an eﬀort not to “confus[e] the present content of (Western) ideas and
concepts [about law] with the criteria of a universal truth and logic.”287 It is
the latter activity, of diﬀerencing, that authoritarian law is most likely to elicit
in functionalist interpretations.
d. Authoritarian Credibility
Judge Cogan’s refusal to defer to the Ministry of Commerce filing raises a
related issue of authoritarian credibility. Are litigation filings inherently more
suspect when they are submitted by an illiberal government? The question, as
posed, might seem unfair, a violation of modernist norms of impartiality and
a tradition of international comity in American law.288 But as the Vitamins
case progressed, courts began to grapple with a related question: how much
deference is owed to a foreign government’s filings concerning its own law?
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that courts are “bound to defer” to all

281 See, e.g., id. at 551 n.39 (describing Professor Shen’s deﬁnition of “self-discipline” as “circular
and unhelpful”).
282 Id. at 551-52.
283 Id. at 553 (emphasis added).
284 Günter Frankenberg, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 414 (1985).
285 Id.
286 Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp.
2d 320, 422 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals
Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011); Frankenberg, supra note 284.
287 Frankenberg, supra note 284.
288 See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (deﬁning “comity” as “the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the . . . acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws”); see also Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543 & n.27 (1987) (“Comity refers to the
spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the
laws and interests of other sovereign states.”).
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reasonable constructions of law proffered by foreign governments. 289 The
Supreme Court disagreed,290 providing guidance that—though not targeted at
autocratic countries explicitly—seemed tailored to yield more skeptical
treatment of authoritarian government filings.
When the Supreme Court granted certioriari, few precedents had
addressed the question presented. In United States v. Pink, the Court had
credited as “conclusive” a Russian declaration of its own law.291 Lower courts
split as to whether Pink mandated outright or merely substantial deference to
submissions from foreign governments.292 Comity and comparative expertise
counseled in favor of deference, but the litigation setting raised a legitimate
concern that foreign governments might misrepresent their law to protect
national interests.
The Vitamins case brought this tension into sharp relief. In 2002, China
had represented to the WTO that it no longer engaged in “export
administration . . . of vitamin C,” a claim that appeared at odds with its
federal ﬁlings asserting that Chinese law compelled price ﬁxing.293
Citing this inconsistency, 294 the Supreme Court held that comity
demanded only “respectful consideration” of a foreign sovereign’s ﬁlings.295
“Conﬂicting statements” or those made “in the context of litigation,” it
explained, may be grounds for more “caution.” 296 As for the “appropriate
weight” to accord a given foreign interpretation, the Court continued, several
factors stood out: “the statement’s clarity, thoroughness and support; its
context and purpose; the transparency of the foreign legal system; the role and
289 Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 837 F.3d 175, 189 (2d Cir. 2016),
vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018).
290 Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. at 1869.
291 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 220 (1942). In Pink, the foreign declaration was obtained
by the American government through “diplomatic channels.” Id. at 218.
292 Compare D’Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (D. Del. 1976) (“The
principle of Pink requires this Court to accept the opinion of the attorney general of Mexico as an
official declaration by that government . . . .”), and Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324,
1363 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (“Plaintiffs argue that this opinion [from the attorney general of the Philippines]
is conclusive as to the scope and effect of the law of the Philippines.”), with Vitamin C Litig., 810 F.
Supp. 2d at 540-42 (concluding that, under Pink and its progeny, “a foreign government’s statement
is not entitled to absolute or complete deference in all circumstances”), and Karaha Bodas Co. v.
Pertamina, 313 F.3d 70, 92 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Where a choice between two interpretations of ambiguous
foreign law rests finely balanced, the support of a foreign sovereign for one interpretation furnishes
legitimate assistance in the resolution of interpretive dilemmas.”).
293 Vitamin C Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d at 552. The Ministry sought to explain this inconsistency
away by arguing that WTO statement referred to the introduction of the 2002 Price Veriﬁcation and
Chop scheme. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (No. 161220) (“In 2002, we adopted the PVC method . . . . And that’s the approach that we took. That’s
what we said to the WTO.”).
294 Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. at 1871, 1873-74.
295 Id. at 1874.
296 Id. at 1873.
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authority of the entity or oﬃcial oﬀering the statement; and the statement’s
consistency with the foreign government’s past positions.”297
Taken together, these factors are likely to disproportionately impact how
courts treat submissions from authoritarian countries. A test that looks to the
“transparency” of a foreign legal system will naturally yield less deference for
countries arranged along autocratic lines. 298 The reference to non“transparency” might even be read as a euphemism for illiberalism. Further,
a test that probes a “statement’s consistency” with a foreign government’s
prior pronouncements will tend especially towards surfacing instances of
authoritarian prevarication. As above explained, autocrats have a track record
of embracing or denying legality as it suits them, deploying “laws” that may
be hidden or sham. A regime that uses law selectively at home is probably
more likely to do so in litigation abroad.299 All to say, the Supreme Court’s
deference regime sensibly captures concerns driven, at least in part, by
authoritarian practices.
B. Formal and Functional Approaches Compared
The choice between formalism and functionalism implicates several
competing values. Formalism oﬀers compelling heuristic and expressive
advantages, but its rote application can yield overnormalizing misstatements
of foreign law. Functionalism is generally more “accurate,” but it can also be
costly, impractical and—taken too far—potentially violative of basic legal
norms. As neither method is a panacea, judges should instead tailor method
to context, balancing formalism’s heuristic usefulness against functionalism’s
contextual advantages.
1. On Accuracy
As noted above, Rule 44.1 governs foreign law determinations in federal
court. Its most important policy goal is to promote accurate interpretations of
foreign law. Prior to the Rule’s enactment, courts applied a fact-based approach
to foreign law—a framework that tended to exclude relevant aids to

Id. at 1873-74 (emphasis added).
The Court did not specify in which direction the “transparency” factor should cut. Lack of
transparency may mean a foreign sovereign can more easily “game” the law to support its position,
but it could also be a reason to defer to a foreign sovereign on grounds of expertise. Context,
however, suggests the former.
299 Of course liberal countries can also be criticized for “instrumentalizing” or selectively
ignoring law, particularly international law. See, e.g., Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal
Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 6 (2011) (arguing that many if not all
countries, including the United States and those within the European Union, at times evince selfinterested and exceptional approaches to international law).
297
298
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interpretation for violating technical rules of admissibility.300 Rule 44.1 did away
with this model. One of its inherent policies is that “whenever possible issues of
foreign law should be resolved . . . on the basis of a full presentation and
evaluation of the available materials.”301 Judges are thus “obliged to take an active
role in the process of ascertaining foreign law.”302 While they are not required
to engage in private research, they are encouraged to do so when appropriate.303
Though accuracy is one of the Rule’s cardinal policies, the Rule does not
deﬁne the term. What does it mean to get foreign law “right”? The answer, I
contend, should vary with context.
In one category of cases, judges must apply foreign law as a binding rule
to the parties before her. In this setting, courts generally follow the “basic
prescriptive principle” that “foreign law must be applied as it would be by the
courts of the foreign jurisdiction.”304 This “predictive” rule has an analog in
federal interpretation of state law. Under Erie, federal courts sitting in
diversity must interpret state law as would that state’s highest court.305 The
predictive rule is well suited to the conﬂicts context, in which two parties, for
example, might have contracted for a speciﬁc country’s law to apply. It would
undermine basic notions of harmony and consistency if Saudi law applied
diﬀerently in Saudi Arabia than in Chicago.306
In other cases involving foreign law, the aim is to ascertain foreign law as
evidence of foreign practice. An asylum judge may ask whether a family
planning law subjects violators to forced abortions, but only as a data point
in assessing whether forced abortions are being perpetrated in fact. 307
Similarly, a judge contemplating whether to dismiss for forum non
conveniens naturally cares about whether the written laws of the alternative
300 See Alexander, supra note 8, at 605-08 (describing the “sudden death” effect of the common
law fact-based approach, where failure to prove foreign law “often resulted in immediate dismissal of
the claim based upon a foreign law”); Brown, supra note 8, at 181-82 (describing how “the proper
foreign law was often excluded from consideration by the party’s inability to put foreign law materials
in a format that would satisfy the technical rules of admissibility”: specifically, “authentication, best
evidence, and hearsay”); Miller, supra note 8, at 620-24 (noting that the fact-based approach was so
burdensome “that it actually exacerbated the difficulties inherent in proving foreign law”).
301 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2444 (3d ed. 2008, rev. 2020).
302 Id.
303 See id. Some judges believe that “a court has the affirmative obligation to seek out the
applicable foreign law whether the parties have established that law or not.” Miner, supra note 8, at 583.
304 Alexander, supra note 8, at 630. Most countries apply this principle. See NISHITANI, supra
note 8, at 31 (discussing how in most major jurisdictions foreign law is “interpreted and applied . . . in
the same manner that a judge in that country would—to achieve international harmony and respect the
parties’ interest”). Consistency can, among other things, mitigate the risk of forum shopping.
305 See, e.g., Stuart v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that
federal courts must “predict how [the state’s] highest court would rule”).
306 See NISHITANI, supra note 8, at 31.
307 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2018).
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forum provide an adequate remedy, but she is (or at least, should be) more
interested in whether local courts actually provide such remedies in
practice.308 It would subvert the policies of dismissal to send a suit abroad
based on a sham law. In cases such as these, “accuracy” is not just a prediction
of how courts might rule on a question of law, but an honest appraisal of what
has happened, or what may happen, on the ground.
While concepts of accuracy can vary between cases, functional approaches
to interpretation generally surpass formal approaches in getting the law
“right.” 309 This is especially true in the latter category of cases, which is
explicitly oriented towards uncovering law as evidence of practice. But
functionalism is also well-suited to traditional conﬂicts scenarios governed by
the predictive rule. All would agree that standing in the shoes of a foreign
jurist is an inherently contextual exercise.
a. Qualifying the Predictive Rule
In the authoritarian setting, however, the predictive rule requires some
qualiﬁcation. Taken literally, that rule requires courts to rule as a foreign court
would rule. But because illiberal courts are often subject to regime pressure,
one might wonder whether, or how, functionalist predictions might account
for this possibility.
Consider the following hypothetical. An American court must decide
whether one of China’s champion technology companies violated Chinese
law. Assume that the company unequivocally violated rules that legal oﬃcials
unanimously recognize as law and that Chinese courts have repeatedly
applied. But assume further that any sanctions would be crippling for the
company, undermining China’s long-term industrial strategy. As a student of
Chinese law, I predict that a Chinese court would rule for the company; the
levers of Party-state inﬂuence would ensure such an outcome.310 But should
an American court give eﬀect to this prediction?

308 See Guimei v. Gen. Elec. Co., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 187-88 (Ct. App. 2009) (crediting expert
opinion that focused on both the availability of certain procedural rights on paper and on the
operation of courts in practice).
309 This is not to suggest that functionalist approaches are always accurate. Our subjective
biases can shape how we ﬁlter and emphasize foreign legal information, even if our attention is to
function rather than form. See William P. Alford, On the Limits of Grand Theory in Comparative Law,
61 WASH. L. REV. 945, 946, 955-56 (1986).
310 See WANG, supra note 148, at 64-85 (describing how cases of important social impact are
not often dealt with through application of formal law, but instead through broader considerations
of social interests, often through “adjudication committees” within courts or local party committees
that supervise judicial work). In fact the Chinese government would not likely bring such a case to
begin with, but let’s ignore that for the sake of the hypothetical.
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The short answer is no. Literal predictions of this sort would violate basic
positivist intuitions about law.311 What constitutes law is typically a matter of
social convention, of what judges and legal oﬃcials recognize the law to be.312
While a sanction-backed command from a party boss to ﬂout law may also
regulate conduct, that is not itself law, for judges and other oﬃcials would
nevertheless describe such instructions as meddling with law, the opposite of
law. That is why, as William Baude and Stephen Sachs point out, we often
speak of the Soviet Union as lacking in the rule of law—“far too often, the
law was not what ruled.”313
For this reason, the predictive rule requires an important modiﬁcation.
Courts should not just do as foreign courts would do; they should predict how
a foreign court would rule if interpreting the law in good faith. This may have
been implicit in previous formulations of the rule, but—given the
authoritarian setting—it warrants being said out loud.
This formulation of the predictive rule is grounded in sound policy. When
parties select a forum’s law to apply, it is fair to assume they would like the
law to be applied as good-faith courts would interpret it—not as varied by
political instruction.314 While this could lead to some disuniformity, in the
sense that an American court might reach a diﬀerent conclusion on Saudi law
than a Saudi court would, the alternative would do away entirely with any
pretense that American courts are interpreting “law” at all.
A similar approach ought to govern how courts regard foreign judicial
decisions. If the meaning of a statute is clear, but in a recent case a party
committee instructed a judge to interpret it diﬀerently, an American court
should not credit that case as persuasive. Admittedly, direct evidence of
interference is rarely attainable. But formalist approaches would miss it
entirely. Functionalist judging, on the other hand, might be a little more
skeptical of sensitive cases that were sparsely reasoned or inconsistent with
local methods or meanings.
Finally, formal sources of law can be necessary inputs within this
functionalist brand of judging. If it is determined through a more contextual
inquiry that particular kinds of formality are locally and legally authoritative,
See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012).
For a sophisticated jurisprudential treatment of what happens when informal practices
depart from an “oﬃcial story of the law,” see generally William Baude & Stephen Sachs, The Oﬃcial
Story of the Law (June 9, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author).
313 Id. at 33; see also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2388
(2015); Stephen Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 565 (2019). See generally Mikolaj
Barczentewicz, The Illuminati Problem and Rules of Recognition, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 500 (2018).
314 A more “realist” account may point out that some businesses choose certain laws or forums
precisely because they can exercise extralegal inﬂuence over them. See WANG, supra note 148, at 83.
But giving judicial eﬀect to manipulations of this sort would be contrary to basic public policies,
including notions of fairness and legality.
311
312
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formal law can help judges distinguish between what is law and what are
actually eﬀorts to subvert it.
b. Formalism and Inaccuracy
Formalism’s primary weakness is that it systematically tends towards
misstatements of foreign law. By underestimating the amount of distance
between the foreign system and our own, formalism risks overnormalizing
autocratic law.315
Formalist overnormalizing takes a variety of forms. A straightforward
example, applicable to foreign law generally, is the tendency of some courts
to apply local tools of statutory construction to foreign statutes. In
interpreting China’s Marriage Law, a court in California once asserted that
since the “sole issue is one of statutory construction,” it would “apply the
following familiar rules to this task”:316 it would “ascertain the intent to the
Legislature,” beginning with the “words of a statute” and “their ordinary
meaning”; if the language “is clear and ambiguous,” it would “go no further”;
but if multiple reasonable constructions were possible, it would consult such
“extrinsic aids” as the “the evils to be remedied,” the “legislative history,” and
“public policy.”317 This programmatic approach to interpretation would be
familiar to any American student of legislation. But for a Chinese judge called
to interpret the same Chinese statute, a recitation of this decision tree
structure would seem wholly out of place. The formal-universalist logic here
is apparent: they have statutes, as do we; they must interpret those statutes
as we do here.318
Formalism’s tendency to overnormalize is particularly stark in the context of
autocratic law. More than once, U.S. courts have cited and analyzed the Chinese
Constitution, despite its widely recognized status as something of a sham text.319

315 Considered in this way, the “antiauthoritarian biases” described in Part II can be thought
of as having overforeignizing eﬀects, causing judges to overestimate the amount of distance between
foreign law and our own.
316 In re Marriage of Song & Ye, No. H030253, 2007 WL 1475843, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 22,
2007). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit once interpreted Pakistani law using “the canons of statutory
construction with which we interpret our own laws.” United States v. Mitchell, 985 F.2d 1275, 1281
(4th Cir. 1993). The case has been cited for the proposition that “in making foreign law
determination[s], [a] court may draw upon the canons of statutory interpretation with which U.S.
courts interpret American laws.” United States v. Xu, No. 02-0674, 2008 WL 1315632, at *3 (D. Nev.
Apr. 10, 2008).
317 Marriage of Song & Ye, 2007 WL 1475843, at *6.
318 For a general account of this problem, see NISHITANI, supra note 8, at 31; Nicholas M. McLean,
Comment, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation in Transnational Litigation, 122 YALE L.J. 303 (2012).
319 See Keith Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China, 7 E. ASIA L. REV. 51,
68-69 (2012) (describing official statements that the Chinese Constitution is “not a basis for litigation”);
Qianfan Zhang, A Constitution Without Constitutionalism? The Paths of Constitutional Development in China,
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In one case, a federal district court enjoined removal of a Chinese citizen to
China on the ground that he would be “subjected to the harshest possible
treatment” for having violated, inter alia, the Chinese Constitution. 320 In
another case, a district court cited several provisions of the Chinese Constitution
to support its conclusion that a Chinese business entity was “state-owned.”321
Although neither judge directly applied the P.R.C. Constitution to the parties,
both treated the document as persuasive “law” like any other, without any
disclaimers or qualifiers as to its tenuous status within China’s de facto legal
hierarchy.322 The courts’ formalist error was to treat a document bearing formal
resemblance to our own as if it functioned in broadly similar ways.
Formalism can overnormalize in the foreign law evaluation setting too.
Consider Tang v. Synutra International, Inc., a case involving China’s 2008
tainted milk scandal. 323 Parents of children who had ingested melaminecontaminated milk products brought suit against the producers’ parent
corporation in federal court.324 Defendants moved to dismiss for forum non
conveniens.325 To prove the futility of litigating the case in China, the parents
oﬀered declarations from several Chinese lawyers who had tried but failed to
convince local courts to process their complaints.326 The Court nonetheless
deemed China an adequate forum,327 citing inter alia a declaration from the
Supreme People’s Court stating that Chinese courts “were ready to process
civil lawsuits for tainted-milk cases.”328 A declaration of this nature from an
American court might be credited at face value, but given the far more speciﬁc

8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 950, 952 (2010) (“China’s Constitution lacks any meaningful mechanism for
implementation and is left unguarded against official violations . . . .”).
320 Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
321 Trans Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 283-90 (S.D.
Tex. 1997).
322 The P.R.C Constitution is fundamentally a socialist constitution, conceived as an “overtly
authoritarian instrument[] of class power.” Yash P. Ghai, Constitutions and Governance in Africa: A
Prolegomenon, in LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD 51, 57-60 (Sammy Adelman & Abdul
Paliwala eds., 1993). Though it is generally not regarded by the legal community as a source of
applicable law, it has over time taken on certain other functions: it describes how certain organs of
the state operate in relation with one another (though it largely omits the role of the Party); it
memorializes certain policy priorities (though often only after elite consensus has been reached);
and it conveys certain aspirational commitments of the party-state. Thus, while it is not per se
problematic for a judge to reference the Chinese Constitution, doing so accurately requires stepping
away from oversimplifying formalist assumptions.
323 No. 09-0088, 2010 WL 1375373 (D. Md. Mar. 29, 2010).
324 Id. at *1-2.
325 Id. at *5-12.
326 Id. at *6-7. One lawyer described having been summoned to a meeting in which local legal
oﬃcials “demanded all attorneys to withdraw from representation on tainted-milk cases.” Id. at *6.
327 Id. at *12.
328 Id. at *9.
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aﬃdavits describing a diﬀerent reality on the ground, the Court arguably
mistook formality for truth.329
2. Eﬃciency and Cost
When it comes to getting foreign law “right,” formalism excels not in its
overall accuracy, but in its heuristic-like eﬃciency in producing accurate
enough interpretations at minimal cost. As explained, many autocracies have
bifurcated legal systems. When their laws arise in American court, they tend
to involve commercial matters, where formal written law is generally clear
and faithfully applied.330 In such cases, it is hardly necessary for judges to
conduct a textured, searching inquiry into which foreign rules are followed
and to what degree, and whether such rules conform to local conceptions of
“law.” Formalism, then, can serve as a kind of “stopping rule” heuristic, a
“simpliﬁed decision-making strategy” that enables judges to reach
satisfactory rather than optimal decisions.331 Even if formalism gets some of
the nonmodernist cases wrong, it will get most other cases right. In the end,
that might be good enough.
Formalism’s efficiency is especially appealing in light of the costs associated
with contextual inquiry. One might think of judges here as “cognitive misers,”
agents who are “limited in their capacity to process information and often seek
shortcuts to reduce mental burdens.”332 When judges privilege function over
form, they must forgo formalism’s “simplifying” advantages and impose on
themselves greater temporal and cognitive burdens. 333 Such burdens are
particularly onerous for the docket-constrained frontline judges who are most
often tasked with interpreting foreign laws.
Functionalist inquiries also require the use of foreign law experts. Though
experts may be better attuned to the omissions, assumptions, and norms that

329 The Court also considered the availability of nonlegal remedies, such as a state
compensation fund. Id. at *10-11.
330 See supra subsection II.B.3.
331 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behaviorial Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1077-78 (2000). In the face of complexity
and constraint, “a decision not to optimize . . . might be globally ‘rational.’” Id. at 1078. Maggie Gardner
has shown how similar heuristics explain why judges have embraced more “parochial” doctrines, given
the “unfamiliarity and complexity of transnational litigation.” Gardner, supra note 26, at 959-63.
332 Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 21 (201); see also Matthew
Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 912-16 (2015) (discussing time,
eﬀort, and cognitive decision costs involved in judicial decisionmaking).
333 See Lee, supra note 332, at 25-26 (noting that “formalism operates as a heuristic that lowers the
cognitive burdens associated with lay adjudication of [highly technical and complicated] disputes”).
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underlie an unfamiliar legal system, 334 they can require signiﬁcant
expenditures. Experts’ rates are often high and their contextual inquiries can
complicate a simpler formalist story.335 In some cases, experts might even take
more extreme positions in court than they would in an academic paper,
producing more confusion than clarity for a deciding judge.336
3. Expressivity and Comity
Finally, there are communicative externalities associated with the choice
of method. Formalism may appeal to those wishing to convey certain ideas
about legal legitimacy, while functionalism’s relativism may better accord with
norms of judicial comity.
Formalism enables American judges to express their fidelity to core
concepts of law. By presuming modernist correspondences even when they do
not exist, judges signal that “law” must satisfy certain minimal but universal
principles. They are thus attentive to the “expressive function of law,” which
Cass Sunstein defines as “the function of law in ‘making statements’ as
opposed to controlling behavior directly.” 337 Judges may intend such
expression to shape norms or understandings about law, either at home or in
autocratic countries, or they may see formalism as an integrity-enhancing way
of expressing their own commitment to the “rule of law.”338 In contrast, some
functionalisms might be assailed for being too flexible about legality.339
But formalism can have expressive shortcomings too. When judges refuse
to credit as “law” rules that don’t resemble modernist structures, they may be
accused of failing to extend appropriate comity to other nations. 340 Such
thinking underlay Judge Brown’s assertion that a refusal to credit unwritten
laws would be “unduly condescending toward foreign legal regimes structured
334 See Bodum USA Inc. v. La Cafetière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 638-39 (7th Cir. 2010) (Wood, J.,
concurring) (“There will be many times when testimony from an acknowledged expert in foreign
law will be helpful, or even necessary.”).
335 See Wilson, supra note 8, at 909 (describing expert testimony as an “expensive proposition”).
336 See id. at 909-10 (discussing the temptation of experts hired by parties in a suit to “conceal
doubts, overstate the strong, and downplay the weak aspects of the case”). But see Miner, supra note
8, at 588 (stressing the ability of judges to determine the reliability of foreign expert testimony).
337 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996).
338 Cf. id. at 2025-28 (discussing consequentialist and nonconsequentialist understandings
of expressivity).
339 Formalism can thus be thought of as a compromise between Slaughter’s view that judges
should treat illiberal law as nonlaw, and what one might caricature as a free-wheeling functionalism,
which might recognize a plant or a rosebud as law.
340 In the conﬂicts context, which is traditionally sourced in comity principles, applying
foreign law in a U.S. court can be viewed as a kind of prescriptive comity, a recognition “that the
other nation has jurisdiction to prescribe rules for the transaction or event.” William S. Dodge,
International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2099-100 (2015). Refusing to credit
such rules could thus be regarded as a failure to extend appropriate comity.
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diﬀerently from the system used in the United States, Europe, or akin.”341
Modern comparative law thinkers speak similarly of the ﬁeld’s formalist past.
Annelise Riles describes nineteenth-century comparative law as preoccupied
with “an excessively narrow deﬁnition of law . . . as the edicts of legislatures
or courts alone—which often led to the conclusion that those who had no
such institutions had no ‘law.’” 342 But as the ﬁeld progressed to a more
“scientiﬁc” functionalism that gave a “new attention to ‘context,’” the
oﬀensive typologies of the ﬁeld’s formalist past were discarded. 343 Even
today, formalist methods can sometimes carry a subtle universalism, a sense
that your law must resemble ours.
Some judges may also see a probing functionalism as incompatible with
the judicial role. The act of assessing the integrity or honesty of another court
or sovereign’s actions may implicate legitimate concerns over the separation
of powers.344 In some settings, courts have indeed sought to avoid “sitting in
judgment over the public acts” of other states.345 But as Zachary Clopton
points out, such judgments are common, even routine, across many other
doctrinal areas, including forum non conveniens and foreign judgments
recognition.346 These doctrines “are routine and unremarkable, they protect
important domestic and individual concerns, and they have not sparked
international incident.” 347 In the end, a heightened attention to extralegal
meddling is unlikely to disturb structural interests any more than the
uncontroversial inquiries into judicial impartiality that occur in other
evaluative contexts.
C. Future Directions
I have shown that autocratic law poses distinct challenges for American
courts. Such challenges bring into sharper focus the complexities of foreign
law interpretation generally. Indeed a court interpreting Iranian law must be
mindful of not just possible departures from legal modernism, but also of
issues stemming from language, translation, culture, and religion.

341 Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp.
2d 320, 424 n.100 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated and remanded sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
342 See Riles, supra note 237, at 228.
343 Id.
344 Courts may hesitate, for example, to wonder whether certain past decisions were made
under political inﬂuence.
345 Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980). Such
doctrines include the act of state doctrine, the public law taboo, and Zschernig abstention. See
Clopton, supra note 108, at 6-10.
346 See Clopton, supra note 108, at 10-25.
347 Id. at 5.
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Of the many approaches attempted elsewhere, 348 I suggest a relatively
modest solution: to expand the use of court-appointed experts. 349 Most
judges lack the time and capacity to conduct a fully contextual analysis of
every foreign law question presented to her. Parties generally do not enlist
experts unless the ﬁnancial stakes are high, and, even if they do, “dueling”
experts can pull judges towards one of two extremes. While courts have
occasionally appointed their own foreign law experts, such practices are
rare.350 Judges balk at high search and informational costs, and are generally
accustomed to more “passive” models that rely on partisan experts.351
Law schools and court administrators can facilitate judicial reference by
establishing a database of foreign law experts, as Matthew Wilson has
suggested, or special centers dedicated to such purposes.352 Enlisted experts
might even develop norms or standards around costs, enabling lower fees in
exchange for the reputational returns of being a judicially recognized expert
(and also, less cynically, out of a sense of public service).353 Of course courtappointed experts may not be possible, or even useful, in every case, but a
signiﬁcant expansion in their use can help ameliorate some of the enduring
diﬃculties of foreign law.
Methodologically, courts will be best served by tailoring their approach to
the underlying doctrines and policies that spark their encounters with foreign
law. Some triggers, including those that arise in immigration or forum non
conveniens, are explicitly oriented towards how laws are implemented in
practice. Formalism here could unduly prejudice the parties.
In cases where foreign law must be understood primarily as law, however,
eﬃciency concerns make formalism an attractive ﬁrst choice. But even here,
judges should treat formal sources of law as something of a rebuttable
presumption, the ﬁrst rather than the only step in its analysis. Independent
348 Examples include: multilateral conventions for judicial assistance, as in the London
Convention, the Montevideo Convention, and the Minsk Convention; bilateral treaties on access to
foreign law, as between Australia and South Korea; transnational judicial partnerships as in the
European Judicial Network; certiﬁcation, as in U.S. federal practices with respect to state law; and
consultations with comparative law institutes such as the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg. See
NISHITANI, supra note 8, at 24, 47-53.
349 Matthew Wilson has suggested this as one of a number of interesting proposals for
improving accurate statements of foreign law. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 927-32.
350 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706 (authorizing a court to “appoint expert witnesses of its own
selection”); Institut Pasteur v. Simon, 383 F. Supp. 2d 792, 795 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (appointing
French law expert); Wilson, supra note 8, at 928.
351 See Wilson, supra note 8, at 928-29.
352 Wilson, supra note 8, at 930-31.
353 Comparative scholars who complain of “marginalization” from mainstream American law
may ﬁnd new relevancies in their capacity to directly inﬂuence decisionmaking in federal court. See
Riles, supra note 237, at 224 (discussing how “one of the principal preoccupations of [comparative
law] has become how to convince ‘mainstream’ legal scholars of the value of their enterprise”).
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research and expert testimony can unsettle existing assumptions, redirecting
the court towards speciﬁc evidence of law as locally understand or practiced.
The resulting functionalism can bring jurists closer to truth, so long as they
do not stretch basic conceptions of law to the point of becoming contentless.
CONCLUSION
This Article marks an initial foray into the problems of interpreting
autocratic law. It has drawn from two adjacent disciplines: political science
and comparative law. The former teaches that features of authoritarian legal
systems that appear “aberrational” are often rooted in coherent calculation
and regime interest. The latter reﬂects accrued wisdom on how those steeped
in the assumptions of one legal civilization can come to understand the laws
of another. Both disciplines shed important light on the nature of the
challenge and of our possible responses to it.
As autocratic forms of governance retrench in some places and expand in
others, American courts will increasingly encounter legal forms that grind
uncomfortably against preexisting concepts of law. In the face of this
dissonance, jurists can either presume equivalence, however ﬁctitious, or
recognize diﬀerence, however unsettling. Neither approach optimizes on
every factor, and every choice entails tradeoﬀs between important legal
values. In a world of political diﬀerence, such choices will require
considerable thinking in the years to come.

